Abstract
Chapters 5 and 6, with the latter’s appendix, complete the technical background needed to support the constitutional concepts of Chapter 3. Now, as a final technical note, we consider why a number of proposed mechanisms that have precise Lindahl taxes as Nash equilibria cannot deliver the promised outcomes. The sampling method we propose in Chapters 2 and 3 can realistically approximate Lindahl taxes for the voter population. Our object here is to explain why there is no better way to approximate them than by this proposal. A more technical treatment of this point appears in Roberts (1976). See also Groves and Ledyard (1987), pp. 65–68.
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© 2001 The estate of Martin J. Bailey
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Bailey, M.J., Tideman, N. (2001). Why Nash Solutions are Not Solutions. In: Tideman, N. (eds) Constitution for a Future Country. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230287792_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230287792_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40419-3
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