Abstract
This chapter considers the case for an alternative supervisory approach within the field of EU investment services, namely the establishment of a European Securities Regulator (ESR). According to the Prologue, the second criterion that justifies action at EU level is the production of clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the level of the Member States. Where Union action is required, the combination of different policy tools should be considered.1 Does Europe need a pan-European securities regulator? If yes, is the creation of such a body feasible within the legal, political and economic context of Europe? These questions have recently gone beyond the purely academic domain to form the subject of specific political debate between regulators, practitioners and market participants. Although the results of these debates usually end up giving a negative dimension to such a suggestion,2 the very fact that this question is raised in this particular period of time reveals that something is wrong with the present regulatory and supervisory financial architecture.
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Notes
European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper (COM(2001) 428 final, 12 October 2001) 5.
See, for instance, the Reports originated from discussions among the FESE and the Wise Men Group, chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy: FESE, Report and Recommendations on European Regulatory Structures (September 2000);
Committee of Wise Men, Initial Report on Regulation of European Securities Markets (9 November 2000, hereinafter ‘Initial Wise Men Report’).
See Goodhart, C. et al., Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? (London: Bank of England, 1998) 150.
See, for instance, Lomax, R., ‘Supervision in the Single Market’ (1993) 3 Central Banking 36, 39.
On the political feasibility of centralised regulation as well as on the possibility of dealing effectively with sui generis problems of international finance, see Cranston, R., Principles of Banking Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 116.
See, for instance, Kenen, P., Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: Moving beyond Maastricht (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 32–5;
Eichengreen, B., Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved? (Princeton: Princeton University, 1992) 42–4.
See Article 5 EC Treaty (former Article 3b). The positive concept of subsidiarity represents the possibility or even the obligation of interventions from the Community, both aiming to fulfil and enhance human life. Per contra, as seen before, negative subsidiarity refers to the limitations of competences of the Community in relation to its Member States; see Endo, K., ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors’ (1994) 6 Hokkaido Law Review 553.
See Lang, J., ‘European Community Constitutional Law: The Division of Powers Between the Community and the Member States’ (1988) 2 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 209.
Case 300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR 2867, better known as the ‘titanium dioxide judgement’. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Barents, R., ‘The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of Community Legislation’ (1993) 30 CMLRev 85, 87 et seq.
McDonald, F. and Dearden, S., European Economic Integration (Essex: Longman, 3rd ed., 1999) 29.
The Economic and Social Committee shares this view; see its Opinion on ‘Mutual Recognition in the Single Market’ (OJ C 116/14, 20 April 2001). Per contra, the United Kingdom clearly favours mutual recognition over harmonisation; see HM Treasury, Realising Europe’s Potential: Economic Reform in Europe (White Paper, February 2002) 81.
This has recently been the clear position of the Commission; see European Commission, Better Lawmaking 2000 (COM(2000) 772 final, 30 November 2000) 6.
Hadjiemmanuil, C., The European Central Bank and Banking Supervision (London: Centre for Commercial Law Studies, 1996) 44.
See, for instance, Davies, H., Euro-Regulation (European Financial Forum Lecture, Brussels, 8 April 1999);
Hopt, K., ‘Special Issue on the Economic Law of the Member States in an Economic and Monetary Union: Report’ (1976) 13 CMLRev 147, 250;
Avgouleas, E., ‘The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic Analysis, Subsidiarity and Investor Protection’ (2000) 1 ELJ 72, 84; Initial Wise Men Report, 26.
As a result of the stronger role of EU legislature in the process of integration and the addition of new powers, the number of such conflicts has considerably increased. See Ehlermann, C.D., ‘The European Community, Its Law and Lawyers’ (1992) 29 CMLRev 213, 216–17.
For more details, see Toth, A.G., Oxford Encyclopedia of European Community Law: Vol I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 303–10;
Emiliou, N., ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: the Legal Basis of Community Measures before the Court of Justice’ (1994) 5 ELRev 488, 492–5.
Weiler describes Article 100a as ‘the single most important provision of the SEA’ for introducing majority voting in the Council; see Weiler, J., The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?’ and other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 68.
See Ehlermann, C.D., ‘The Internal Market following the Single European Act’ (1987) 24 CMLRev 361, 382.
See Crosby, S., ‘The Single Market and the Rule of Law’ (1991) 16 ELRev 451.
See Thieffry, G., ‘Towards a European Securities Commission’ (1999) 10 IFLR 14, 15.
Weiler, J., ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 8 Yale Law Journal 2403, 2445.
The rationale for this trend may be traced to a main difference between a specific Treaty provision and Article 308 serving as the legal basis for the establishment of a new body: it may be alleged that the substantive range of its activities will tend to be narrower in the first case than in the second, because in the latter case the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Parliament, has a wide margin of discretion in determining the necessity of EU action in order to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty. See Lenaerts, K., ‘Regulating the regulatory process: “delegation of powers” in the European Community’ (1993) 18 ELRev 23, 43.
Thieffry, G., ‘After the “Lamfalussy” Report: The First Steps towards a European Securities Commission (ESC)’, in Andenas, M. and Avgerinos, Y. (eds), Financial Market Supervision in Europe: Towards a Single Regulator? (London: Kluwer, forthcoming 2003).
See Committee of Wise Men, Final Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (15 February 2001).
Danthine, J. et al., The Future of European Banking (London: CEPR, 1999) 98; see also below, note 255.
See Türk, A., ‘The Role of the Court of Justice’, in Andenas, M. and Türk, A. (eds), Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC (London: Kluwer, 2000) 248.
For the different functions of agencies and committees, see Everson, M., ‘Administrating Europe?’ (1998) 2 JCMS 195, 198. The superiority of an independent body is obvious, as the latter would be ‘largely shielded from explicitly political processes by their founding statutes, permanent staff, organisational independence, varying degrees of budgetary autonomy and direct networking with national administrators, whereas committees, born of a strong national desire to retain control over the setting and consequences of European regulatory norms, are more fluid in their composition and so deeply implicated in political processes that their status as “administrative” bodies is questioned’.
Haas, E. (1958), ‘The Uniting of Europe’, in Nelsen, B. and Stubb, A. (eds), The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (London: Macmillan, 2nd edn, 1998) 139–44.
Some scholars conclude that neo-functionalism failed to provide an adequate explanation of the process of European integration. See, for instance, Keohane, R. and Hoffmann, S., ‘Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s’, in Keohanne and Hoffman (eds), The New European Community — Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder: Westview, 1991) 1–40;
Moravcsik, A. ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’ (1993) 4 JCMS 473, 478–80;
Taylor, P., International Organization in the Modern World (New York: Pinter, 1993) 9.
For the opposite view see Kondgen, J., ‘Rules of Conduct: Further Harmonisation?’, in Ferrarini, G. (ed.), European Securities Markets: The Investment Services Directive and Beyond (London: Kluwer, 1998) 129. Kondgen believes that minimum harmonisation was designed to safeguard national autonomy and to preserve competition among Member States rules.
See Bratton, W. et al., International Regulatory Competition and Coordination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 35.
Majone, G., Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996) 66.
Scale economies may be defined generally as those benefits that result when the increased size of a single operating unit produces a single product, and reduces the unit cost of production. The theory of scope economies, on the other hand, states that the average total cost decreases as a result of increasing the number of different goods produced. Although the empirical evidence on economies of scale and scope is elusive, it appears that with recent technological improvements, relatively small-scale financial firms are likely to improve their cost and revenue efficiency by consolidating and achieving a larger size and scope of activities and by decreasing their compliance costs. There is an extensive literature on economies of scale and scope. See, generally, Pratten, C., Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971);
Chandler, A., Scale and Scope: the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge: Belkman Press, 1990).
For their influence on the European Single Market, see Owen, N., Economies of Scale, Competitiveness, and Trade Patterns within the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983);
Emerson, M. et al., The Economics of 1992: The European Commission’s Assessment of the Economic Effects of Completing the Internal Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988);
Holmes, P., ‘Economies of Scale, Expectations and Europe 1992’ (1989) 12 World Economy 525;
European Commission, Economies of Scale: Impact on Competition and Scale Effects (London: Kogan Page, EarthScan, 1997).
Schmidtchen, D. and Cooter, R. (eds), Constitutional Law and Economics of the European Union (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997) 160.
For similar or different categorisations of transaction cost, see Goodhart et al., op. cit., note 3, 150; Majone, op. cit., note 70, 69–70; Alfon, I. and Andrews, P. Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation (FSA Occasional Paper Series No. 3, September 1999) 16–19.
See Scharph, F., ‘The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration’ (1988) 66 Public Administration 239.
Although it would be wrong to assume that all market actors share the same preferences, it seems that the only ones that will not generate gains from decreased legal cost are those who gain from costly law, notably lawyers. See Ogus, A., ‘Competition between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law’ (1999) 48 ICLQ 405, 410.
Rose-Ackerman, S., Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State (New York: Free Press, 1993) 172.
See Briault, C., The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator (FSA Occasional Paper Series No. 2, May 1999) 26.
See Deutsche Bank Research, Regulation and Banking Supervision: Caught Between the Nation State and Global Financial Markets (Frankfurt: EMU Watch No. 86, 29 June 2000) 4.
Hertig, G., ‘Regulatory Competition for EU Financial Services’ (2000) 2 Journal of International Economic Law 349, 365. Generally speaking, the ability of pressure groups to influence decision-making differs across industries and subject matter. However, public choice teaches us that industrial groups will be more successful than investor groups. See Schmidtchen and Cooter, op. cit., note 73, 165–6.
Lee, R., ‘Regulation of Capital Markets in the European Union’, in Newman, P. (ed.), 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (London: Macmillan, 1998) 230.
Werner Seifert, for instance, chief executive of Deutsche Börse, is frustrated by the lack of progress so far; see The Economist, ‘No SECs please, we’re Europeans’ (21 August 1999) 62. However, the formal approach of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges hardly moves in the same line; see FESE Report, op. cit., note 2.
See generally, Stigler, G., ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics 3.
Peacock, A. et al., The Regulation Game (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984);
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G., Privatization: An Economic Analysis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988);
Laffont, J. and Tirole, J., ‘The politics of government decision-making: A theory of regulatory capture’ (1991) 4 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1089.
Before the crisis, ‘lax prudential rules and financial oversight led to a sharp deterioration in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios’; Fischer, S., The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF (Paper presented at the Midwinter Conference of the Bankers’ Association for Foreign Trade, Washington, 22 January 1998). There was excessive government ownership or involvement in banks, which resulted in too much ‘connecting lending’ with all the attendant dangers of concentration of credit risk and lack of arms-length credit decisions;
Goldstein, M., The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications (Washington: IIE, June 1998).
See Taylor, M., Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century (London: Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, 1995) 15; Goodhart et al., op. cit., note 3, 156.
See Davies, H., Building the Financial Services Authority; What’s New? (Travers Lecture, London Guildhall University Business School, 11 March 1999).
Edwards, G., ‘Legitimacy and flexibility in post-Amsterdam Europe’ in Boer et al., Coping with Flexibility and Legitimacy after Amsterdam (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1998) 139.
According to Snyder, legitimacy refers to the belief that a specific institution is widely recognised or at least accepted as being the appropriate institution to exercise specific powers; see Snyder, F., ‘EMU Revisited: Are we Making a Constitution? What Constitution are we Making?’ in Craig, P. and de Burca, G. (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 463.
For example, see Vos, E., ‘Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies?’ (2000) 5 CMLRev 1113, 1125.
In banking, three committees are in place: the Banking Advisory Committee, the Groupe de Contact and the Banking Supervisory Committee of the ECB. In insurance, we have the Insurance Committee and the Groupe de Contact by the Conference of Insurance Supervisors. In securities, it should be noted that a High Level Securities Supervisors Committee was in place between 1992–2001. However, most of its functions have been undertaken by FESCO. Also, two Contact Committees, one for the listing and prospectus rules and one for UCITS, exist to facilitate harmonised implementation. Nevertheless, these committees have no comitology powers, which partially explains their weak influence. Recently, however, the Economic and Financial Committee proposed arrangements in line with the Lamfalussy framework for all financial sectors and the creation of separate Level 2 and 3 committees; see EFC, Report on Financial Regulation, Supervision and Stability (9 October 2002).
In its session of 14 March 2001, the Parliament voted by 410 to 25 against the regime. Criticism is also crystallised in the compromise reflected in the Von Wogau report, which was voted on 5 February 2002; see EP Report on the Implementation of Financial Services Legislation (A5-0011/2002 final, 23 January 2002).
See European Commission, Financial Services and Progress: 3rd Report (COM(2000) 692/2 final, 8 November 2000, hereinafter ‘3rd Progress Report’) 4. The Commission admits that ‘there are a number of serious concerns and the worry that without more effort in next few months the FSAP will fail to maintain sufficient momentum to achieve the ambitious 2005 deadline’;
European Commission, ‘Working together to maintain momentum’: 2001 Review of the Internal Market Strategy (COM(2001) 198 final, 11 April 2001) 4. See also Initial Wise Men Report, 23. The Committee is indeed concerned that the present system will not be able to deliver the FSAP on time.
Davies, H., Introductory Remarks (Speech at the Eurofi Conference, Paris, 15 September 2000).
Directives’ provisions can be divided into two categories: (a) provisions that leave considerable discretion to Member States and supervisors to set out the detailed regulatory requirements and (b) provisions that allow less discretion. The disadvantage for the former is obvious; each Member State adopts its own standards and implementation methods. The problem with the latter is that, with the boom in securities market developments, the details of the Directives are often out-of-date and each Member State then needs to find its own legal solution. On the functions and the implementation process of directives, see Prechal, S., Directives in European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 3 et seq.
This may lead to significant delay. See Avgerinos, Y., ‘Essential and Non-Essential Measures: Delegation of Powers in EU Securities Regulation’ (2002) 2 ELJ 269. In order to assist in the definition and interpretation of essential and implementing measures, the Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament has established a panel of financial services experts to provide independent advice on the measures set out in the Financial Services Action Plan. The capacity of this group, however, is merely advisory.
If the average time allowed for the implementation of a Directive is added (up to 3 years) one can understand why legislation is often out-of-date by the time it becomes effective; see the latest Commission Internal Market Scoreboard (No. 9, 19 November 2001) 7, and Annex II, Figure AII.3.
See Tison, M., Conduct of Business Rules and their Implementation in the EU Member States (Financial Law Institute WP 2000–14, Gent University, 2000) 4.
The precise meaning of the term ‘directly applicable’ of Article 249 EC has been the subject of debate among commentators. See e.g., Steiner, J., ‘Direct Applicability in EEC Law — A Chameleon Concept’ (1982) 98 LQR 229;
Dashwood, A., ‘The Principle of Direct Effect in European Community Law’ (1978) 16 JCMS 229. However, the ECJ has signified that Member States should not pass any measure which purports to transform a Community Regulation into national law and thus obstruct its direct applicability; see Case 34/73 Variola [1973] ECR 981, Paragraph 10. Moreover, ‘all methods of implementation, which would have the result of creating an obstacle to the direct effect of Community Regulations and of jeopardizing their simultaneous and uniform application in the whole of the Community are contrary to Treaty’; see Case 39/72 Commission v Italy [1973] ECR 101, Paragraph 17.
Craig, P. and de Burca, G., EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 108.
See Joint Forum, Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (February 1999) 106.
See Deutsche Bank, op. cit., note 88; also Breuer, R., Convergence of Supervisory Practices — A Banker’s View (Paper presented at the Conference of European Banking Supervisors, Copenhagen, 20 November 2000).
See Dale, R., ‘Reflections on the BCCI Affair: A United Kingdom Perspective’ (1992) 26 International Law 949;
Norton, J. and Olive, C., ‘Globalization of Financial Risks and International Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from the Barings Debacle’ (1996) 2 International Lawyer 301.
European Commission, The Principle of Subsidiarity (SEC(92) 1990 final, 27 October 1992) 1.
See, for instance, Kanda, H., ‘Commentary 1 on Ruben Lee’s Report No 1, Supervising EU Capital Markets: Do we Need a European SEC?’ in Buxbaum, R. et al., European Economic and Business Law: Legal and Economic Analyses on Integration and Harmonisation (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996) 206.
See ECB, Possible Effects of EMU on the EU Banking Systems in the Medium to Long Term (February 1999) 12.
See Hardouvelis, G. et al., EMU and European Stock Market Integration (CEPR Discussion Paper 2124, April 1999) 33.
See Boland, V. and Guerrera, F. ‘FSA staff brand iX plan a “nightmare”’ (8 September 2000) FT 1.
Investment firms licensed in one market do not automatically receive a passport to operate in another Euronext country as well. They still have to comply with the ISD notification requirement and they continue to be subject to the fragmented supervision and enforcement of the regulator of the home country; see Euronext, Rule Book I (30 July 2001) chapters 2 and 9.
It is a fact that some exchanges, such as Madrid and Athens, have no remote members; see European Commission, Communication on Upgrading the Investment Services Directive (93/22/EEC) (16 November 2000) 7.
See Tison, M., The Investment Services Directive and its Implementation in the EU Member States (Financial Law Institute WP 1999–17, Gent University, 1999) 32.
Giovannini Group, Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the European Union (November 2001). A further report, examining possible developments in the clearing and settlement architecture is scheduled to be produced by the end of 2002.
The Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation, the US umbrella organisation that brings together clearing and settlement for the US securities markets, shows that a single provider can work in the case of certain brokerage operations, such as trade confirmation, settlement and regulatory compliance; see Rosen, R., ‘Clearing up Europe’s Exchanges’ (9 February 2001) FT 19.
See FESE, Second Report and Recommendations on European Regulatory Structures (January 2001) 6; Final Wise Men Report, 16.
European Commission, Clearing and Settlement in the European Union: Main Policy Issues and Future Challenges (COM(2002) 257, 28 May 2002).
As stated by the BIS, ‘safe and reliable settlement systems are essential not only for the stability of securities markets they serve, but often also to payment systems, which may be used by an SSS or may themselves use an SSS to transfer collateral’; see BIS, Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (Consultative Report, January 2001) 7.
Especially for risks in cross-border settlement, see Ferrarini, G., ‘The European Regulation of Stock Exchanges: New Perspectives’ (1999) 3 CMLRev 569, 592.
This need becomes now evident as the CESR and the ECB have joined forces to establish a working group, which will work on the drafting of common standards and recommendations for SSS and counterparties at European level; see CESR Press Release (25 October 2001) found at www.europefesco.org . In particular, they are considering the adoption of common standards for clearing and settlement entities in Europe, based on the G10 CPSS and IOSCO Recommendations and the standards of risk management developed by the European Association of Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (EACH). The CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations have been accepted globally by central banks and securities markets regulators as representing minimum standards for systems involved in the finalisation of transactions; see CPSS-IOSCO, Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (November 2001).
See Sáinz de Vicuña, A., Legal Consequences of the Single Currency (General Report at the FIDE Congress, Helsinki, 1–3 June 2000).
The divergences between technical market issues is not within the scope of this book. For such an assessment, see the first paper issued by the Giovannini Group, The Impact of the Introduction of the Euro on Capital Markets (July 1997).
Mayes, D. et al., Improving Banking Supervision (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001) 61.
European Council, Regulation No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) (OJ L 294/1, 10 November 2001). The Regulation will enter into force on 8 October 2004.
This means that, with growing cross-border exposures, failures in foreign activities constitute an increasing threat for the solvency of the entire financial firm and for the stability of the entire common market. See Mayes, D. and Vesala, J., On the Problems of Home Country Control (Bank of Finland Discussion Paper No. 20/98, 1998) 13.
Duisenberg, W., The Euro as a Catalyst for Legal Convergence in Europe (Speech on the occasion of the Annual Conference of the International Bar Association, Amsterdam, 17 September 2000).
For a comprehensive analysis, see Evans, H., Plumbers and Architects: A Supervisory Perspective on International Financial Architecture (FSA Occasional Paper Series No. 4, January 2000) 6.
Latter, T., Causes and Management of Banking Crises (Centre for Central Banking Studies Handbook No. 12, Bank of England, 1997) 36.
Bingham, Lord Justice, Inquiry into the Supervision of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (HMSO, October 1992, hereinafter ‘Bingham Report’).
House of Commons, Banking Supervision and BCCI: International and National Regulation (Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee, 4th Report, London, 1992) ix.
See Panourgias, L. and Andenas, M., Euro, EMU and the UK Law (Report submitted for the Euro-Spectator Project, April 2001).
The problem is that ‘the use of crisis management instruments has traditionally been confined to banks, because they are the most relevant from the viewpoint of financial stability’ (emphasis added). See Economic and Financial Committee, Report on Financial Stability (EFC/ECFIN/240/00, 8 April 2000, ‘Brouwer Report’) 22.
See the Report by Singapore Inspectors on Baring Futures Singapore (Financial Regulation Report, October 1995, hereinafter ‘Singapore Report’) On the contrary, the findings of the Bank of England Report were that the collapse was chiefly due to ineffective risk management and inadequate internal control. See Bank of England, Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings (18 July 1995, hereinafter ‘Bank of England Report’) Chapter 13, Paragraphs 13.10–13.11.
IOSCO, Guidance on Information Sharing (November 1997);
see also IOSCO, Report on Cooperation between Market Authorities and Default Procedures (March 1996).
FESCO, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities (February 1999).
According to Prati and Schinasi, supervisory practices vary considerably in the EU; see Prati, A. and Schinasi, G. Will the ECB be the LLR in EMU? (Paper presented at the SUERF Conference, Frankfurt, October 1998).
See Louis, J.V. et al., Banking Supervision in the European Community (Brussels: University of Brussels, 1995) 60.
See Gambetta, D., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). See also, Chapter 5, Section C.1.3.
Metcalpe, L., ‘Reforming the Commission: Will Organizational Efficiency Produce Effective Governance?’ (2000) 5 JCMS 817, 829.
See, e.g., Duisenberg, W., The Future of Banking Supervision and the Integration of Financial Markets (Speech delivered at the conference ‘Improving integration of financial markets in Europe’, Turin, 22 May 2000);
ESFRC, ‘The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee: a New Initiative’ (1999) 2 JIBR 137, 140;
Green, D., ‘Enhanced Co-operation among Regulators and the Role of National Regulators in a Global Market’ (2000) 2 JIFM 7, 12.
Lannoo, for instance, advocates a ‘European Board of Financial Supervisors’; Lannoo, K., Challenges to the Structure of Financial Supervision in the EU (CEPS, 1999) 13.
Perpetrators of Internet securities fraud, for instance, can easily move both the location of their web sites and the target location of their fraudulent scheme from one jurisdiction to another, when they encounter difficulties in a particular jurisdiction; see IOSCO, Securities Activity on the Internet (September 1998) 37.
See Bolkestein, F., An Uncertain Europe in the World of Upheaval (Rand Europe Public Policy Lecture, Societeit De Witte, The Hague, 14 June 2002).
See Arlman, P., ‘European Equity Markets after the Euro: Competition and Cooperation across New Frontiers’ (1999) 2 International Finance 139, 146–7. FESE also points out that modernisation of regulation in Europe has to be accompanied by rapid agreement with the US authorities aiming at full and immediate reciprocity of securities market access; see FESE Second Report, op. cit., note 165, 6.
Majone, G., ‘Functional Interests: European Agencies’, in Peterson J. and Shackleton M., The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 328.
See Lamfalussy, A., Presentation on the Special Roundtable on the Findings of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (CEPS, 29 November 2000) (hereinafter ‘CEPS Roundtable’).
Davies, H., Convergence of Supervisory Practice (Speech delivered at the Banking Supervision Conference, Copenhagen, 20 November 2000).
This is evident in the March 2001 IMF’s plans to establish an International Capital Markets Department to enhance its surveillance, crisis prevention and crisis management activities; see http://www.imf.org /external/np/sec/nb/2001/nb0124.htm. See, also, the proposal for a World Financial Authority (WFA) in Eatwell, J. and Taylor, L. International Markets and the Future of Economic Policy (CEPA Working Paper No. 9, August 1998) 14
and in Alexander, K., ‘The Need for Efficient International Financial Regulation and the Role of a Global Supervisor’ in Ferran, E. and Goodhart, C. (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Hart, 2001) 288. Finally, the Economist wonders who regulates firms like Citigroup, the world’s largest and most diverse financial institution;
see The Economist, ‘The regulator who isn’t there’ (18 May 2002) 12.
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Avgerinos, Y.V. (2003). The Case for a European Securities Regulator. In: Regulating and Supervising Investment Services in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286870_7
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