Abstract
Common knowledge plays a role in communication in two manners. First, as stressed by Lewis (1969), conversants need to have some degree of common knowledge (also referred to as common ground) about the meaning of signals. Second, as noted by Clark and Schaefer (1989), conversants will also try and achieve some degree of common knowledge about the fact that is being communicated, in a process that is known as grounding. Signals may get lost, or may be misunderstood, and conversants will seek confirmation that the communicated fact was understood.
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© 2006 Kris de Jaegher
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de Jaegher, K. (2006). Game-Theoretic Grounding. In: Benz, A., Jäger, G., van Rooij, R. (eds) Game Theory and Pragmatics. Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285897_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285897_8
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