Abstract
Suppose two individuals agreed to meet each other tonight at 10.00 o’clock in Amsterdam, but forgot to agree on a place (and don’t have the chance anymore to make an agreement). The two are now facing a coordination problem: only if they make a ‘correlated’ decision, will they land up at the same place and meet each other as desired.
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© 2006 Robert van Rooij and Merlijn Sevenster
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van Rooij, R., Sevenster, M. (2006). Different Faces of Risky Speech. In: Benz, A., Jäger, G., van Rooij, R. (eds) Game Theory and Pragmatics. Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285897_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285897_5
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