Abstract
Philip Arestis’s contributions in modern macroeconomics span an impressively wide range of topics and appear in the large number of papers that he authored. The common characteristic shared by all those contributions is the timeliness and relevance to the main macroeconomic debates that have arisen over the years. Philip Arestis’s contributions cover topics as diverse as the link between financial development and economic growth (e.g., Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Arestis et al. 2001; Arestis et al. 2006), the potential of Keynesian economic policies (e.g., Arestis and Sawyer, 1998), the role of fiscal policy, the endogeneity of money (e.g., Arestis and Sawyer, 2006), monetary policy, the housing market and its implication for the macroeconomy (e.g., Arestis and Karakitsos, 2008), and the effectiveness of inflation targeting (Arestis et al. 2001; Angeriz and Arestis, 2007, 2008), to name just a few. A main focus of his work has been the ‘new consensus’ in macroeconomics as it emerged over the last two decades, that is, the ‘New Neoclassical Synthesis’ (e.g., Arestis, 2007; Arestis and Sawyer, 2008).
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Chortareas, G. (2010). Macroeconomic Consensus and Political Economy Aspects of Monetary Policy Design. In: Fontana, G., McCombie, J., Sawyer, M. (eds) Macroeconomics, Finance and Money. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285583_5
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