Models of Democracy and the Politics of Recognition

Abstract

My aim in this chapter is to conduct a critical analysis of the relationship between democracy and recognition. To date, many discussions of this relationship have focused on a relatively narrow range of issues. Above all, they have been concerned to establish whether — and, if so, how — a democratic polity should guarantee the representation of certain social groups and/or categories of person. Cases often discussed include quotas for women, special representation rights for national minorities, and representation for marginalized and oppressed groups (Kymlicka, 1995; Phillips, 1995; Williams, 1998; Young, 1990, 2000). I would argue that, in at least some cases, these discussions are based on prior but unarticulated assumptions about the relationship between democracy and recognition. One such assumption is to do with the objects of recognition. Does the idea of recognition only concern the status of collective groups, or does it also concern the standing of individual citizens? Another assumption relates to the scope of recognition when evaluating democracy. Should a standard of recognition only be used to evaluate the fairness of democratic procedures, or can it also be used to judge the fairness of outcomes? A third assumption concerns the relationship between recognition and democracy. Are these two political goods always perfectly compatible, or can they come into conflict? And, if they can pull in different directions, then how are such conflicts to be resolved? I would argue that it is only when satisfactory answers to these and other questions have been provided that we can move on to address more substantive issues about the institutional arrangements necessary to achieve democracy and recognition in practice. It is for this reason that I intend to focus in this chapter on a number of fundamental assumptions about the relationship between democracy and recognition.