Negativity

Abstract

The Science of Logic, I argued in the previous chapter, conceives of every pure concept as the unity of its contrary determinations. In line with Kant’s doctrine of the antinomies, Hegel considers the opposition implied in each of these concepts only to emerge when they are used to determine reality as such. Contrary to Kant, however, Hegel conceives of this opposition as a necessary moment of the movement in which these concepts establish the synthesis of their contrary determinations. The Doctrine of Being regards concepts belonging to the sphere of being as ‘imperfect guises of the negation in being’ (L I, 174/157). I take this to mean that Hegel considers all pure concepts to incorporate their contrary determinations to some extent. Insofar as they succeed in doing this, they testify to the principle of absolute negativity which Hegel considers to enact itself in the realms of pure thought, nature and spirit alike.