Citizenship, Identity, and Immigration: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives

Abstract

Over the last two decades there has been increasing recognition amongst political philosophers that ‘the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens’ (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000a, 6). At a minimum, at least the majority of citizens must endorse liberal democratic values, demonstrate tolerance towards those from different cultural or ethnic backgrounds, or with different religious beliefs than their own, be willing to participate in the political process even if for some this participation is limited to voting, and have some commitment to the redistribution of economic and social resources to support public services and to assist those in need. Of course liberal states have coercive means at their disposal to ensure citizen compliance — anti-discrimination laws, compulsory taxation, and, in Australia, compulsory voting. But state coercion in the absence of citizen commitment to liberal democratic principles, institutions and processes, attitudes of tolerance, or some sense of obligation to support fellow citizens in need, is unlikely to secure the conditions necessary for a stable society.