Central bank independence refers to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or governmental influence in the conduct of policy.
- Monetary Policy
- Central Bank
- European Central Bank
- Central Bank Independence
- Real Economic Activity
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Walsh, C.E. (2010). Central Bank Independence. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Monetary Economics. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280854_3
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