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Abstract

Trust is the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another person’s actions, based on beliefs about that person’s trustworthiness.

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© 2010 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Bohnet, I. (2010). trust in experiments. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Behavioural and Experimental Economics. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_32

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