Introduction

Abstract

If the history of the interwar period now seems familiar territory, this is hardly surprising since the narrative has remained essentially unchanged for nearly seventy years. Summarized in seven sentences, it runs as follows. In 1918, when Germany sued for peace, the Entente and Associated powers imposed the Versailles settlement in which, largely at French insistence, Germany suffered substantial losses of territory and population as well as onerous demands for reparations and the ignominy of blame for the war. Meanwhile in the East, Poland re-emerged along with several new states that further encroached upon German land and influence, while the Bolshevik seizure of Russia created an additional source of instability in Europe and beyond. In the following ten years, the English-speaking powers assisted the recovery of Germany, Austria and other countries in Central Europe and sought to reduce the bitter legacy of the Versailles settlement. Their efforts were disrupted when the Wall Street crash triggered the onset of the world economic slump. The collapse of trade and soaring unemployment created the conditions for Hitler to take power in Germany and tempted Japan and Italy to embark upon aggressive imperialist adventures. Attempting to avoid a breakdown of the existing order, the conservative powers Britain and France, with the encouragement of the United States, appeased the aggressor powers. When appeasement failed, the conservative powers turned to policies of deterrence and accelerated their rearmament while drawing closer together in anticipation of the coming conflict.⁴

M. Seydoux is chasing a mirage of longstanding, viz. that economics in the case of France and Germany will overcome race antagonism.

Sir William Tyrrell, permanent under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office, 20 March 1928¹

I believe that that civilisation which he speaks of can only be saved by the co-operation of Anglo-Saxons; we cannot count on the other races.

President Hoover’s message to Ramsay MacDonald, British prime minister, 27 January 1932²

I have rather come to the conclusion that the average Englishman — whilst full of common-sense as regards internal affairs — is often muddleheaded, sloppy and gullible when he considers foreign affairs. One often hears such phrases as ‘the Germans are so like us’. Nothing is more untrue.

Sir Horace Rumbold, ambassador to Germany, to Geoffrey Dawson, editor of the Times, 13 June 1936³