Abstract
This chapter will follow the rise of Mosaddeq to power in late April 1951 and his handling of the crisis during the first nine months of his premiership. Early British reaction to oil nationalization as well as the initial American attitude towards Iran and its nationalist movement will be followed by a brief description of the political climate and the early signs of vulnerability forecasting the events of August 1953. Special attention will be given to different phases of the oil negotiations, first in Tehran, brokered by Averell Harriman, and later in Washington where Mosaddeq resided for almost a month and met top American leaders. The chapter also covers the British referral of the oil dispute to the UN Security Council where the aged and ailing prime minister defended Iran’s case.
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Notes
Most authors have projected this move as essentially anti-Shah, implying that the court had rigged the elections. See Abrahamian, 1983: 251; Kinzer, 2003: 69–70; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 52. A letter dated 14 October addressed to the Shah by Mosaddeq contradicts this assumption. He wrote, ‘For people whose rights are violated and infringed on there is no other recourse but to seek refuge to and beg help from your imperial majesty’ (full text cited by Matini, 2005: 205). Recollections by some sit-in participants, such as Makki, Zirakzadeh, Sanjabi and Ahmad Malaki, make it clear that the protesters wished to publicize their cause and had hoped to enlist the Shah’s support against the perceived government interference. Zirakzadeh, in making this point, adds: ‘The court was neither able nor willing to ensure free elections.’ A similar point is made by another participant in the sit-in (and future leader of the National Front), Dr Sanjabi. He writes in his memoirs that the reception at the Court was pretty good and the Shah received and parleyed with Mosaddeq. Then he goes on to say that the real decision-maker then was not the Shah not even the government but the court minister Hazhir who, Sanjabi claims, was connected with foreign interests. See, Karim Sanjabi, Khāterāt’e doctor Karim Sanjabi (Memoirs of Dr. Karim Sanjabi); (Seday’e Mo’āser publisher, 1381–2002, Tehran), p.107. According to Makki, for the first two nights of the sit-in the group was treated to sumptuous dinners hosted by the court minister Hazhir. Then the group decided to go on a hunger strike to press for a response to their petition. The official declaration of the group at the end of the inconclusive four-day sit-in, dated 18 October 1949, speaks of a complaint launched to the Shah (emphasis added) against government interferences. See, Ahmad Malaki, Tārīkhcheh’e Jebhe’e Melli (The History of the National Front); (Stockholm 2005), pp. 4–8.
FRUS, Vol. X, p. 56 fn., and pp. 59–61; Rouhani, 1987: 236; Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 65; Louis, 1984: 672–3. According to the latter source, the Atlee government decided to desist from an all-out attack in a cabinet meeting in late July, but kept open the option of occupying and keeping Abadan.
For an example, see the memoirs of the National Front leader Karim Sanjabi, Khāterāt’e Doctor Karim Sanjabi (Memoirs of Dr Karim Sanjabi) (Tehran: Seday’e Mo’āser Publisher, 1381/2002), p. 113.
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© 2010 Darioush Bayandor
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Bayandor, D. (2010). The Advent of Mosaddeq and the Oil Crisis. In: Iran and the CIA. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230277304_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230277304_3
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