A Sign of Assertion

Abstract

This chapter considers the place of assertoric forms in the analysis of assertion. It is often claimed that such forms are redundant: the sign that Frege employs in his logical symbolism to mark an assertion has been argued to be logically superfluous, and a number of authors have claimed that the declarative mood in natural language has no special relationship with assertion. The general thrust of this chapter will be that such views are misguided. In defence of Frege’s assertion sign, it will be argued that if one wants to use a logical system to build up a representation of how the world is, then such a sign is required on pain of infinite regress. Regarding the declarative mood, we will see how Dummett’s arguments (presented in the previous chapter) concerning the relationship between assertion, truth and belief require that a form specified for the performance of that act be posited. We will also see how a conception of assertion that stresses the commitments undertaken by those who make and assent to assertions leads to a straightforward analysis of non-assertoric uses of the declarative mood, uses which have been put forward as counterexamples to the view that the declarative is a marker of assertoric force.