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The Challenge of Crafting Rules to Change Open-Access Resources into Managed Resources

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Is Economic Growth Sustainable?

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

Garrett Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons” is one of the most cited articles in environment science and is assigned repeatedly to undergraduate students in Environmental Science curricula. Whenever scholars and policy discuss the problems of overuse and degradation of natural resources—whether they be fisheries, forests, irrigation systems, or the atmosphere—Hardin’s article is apt to be relied upon heavily. Why has this almost metaphoric article captured so much attention? First of all, Hardin presents an extraordinarily clear and vivid picture of a pasture “open to all.” Second, his assumptions about the motivation of resource harvesters are consistent with the assumptions about market participants that have proved powerful in deriving propositions regarding highly competitive markets. Viewing resource users as trapped in a tragedy of their own making is consistent with many textbooks on resource economics and the predictions derived from noncooperative game theory for finitely repeated dilemmas (E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994). External authorities are presumably needed to impose rules and regulations on local users since they will not do this themselves. The “scientific management of natural resources” that is frequently taught to future regulators of natural resources presents fisheries, forests, and water resources as relatively homogeneous units that are closely interrelated across a vast domain.

Sections of this chapter draw on Elinor Ostrom, ‘Coping with Tragedies of the Commons’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 2 (1999), 493–535.

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  1. Elinor Ostrom
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Columbia Business School, USA

    Geoffrey Heal (Paul Garrett Professor Of Public Policy and Corporate Responsibility) (Paul Garrett Professor Of Public Policy and Corporate Responsibility)

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Ostrom, E. (2010). The Challenge of Crafting Rules to Change Open-Access Resources into Managed Resources. In: Heal, G. (eds) Is Economic Growth Sustainable?. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230274280_7

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