The Years of Living Dangerously

Abstract

The easing of Turkey’s preoccupation with Iraq after Özal’s death, one Turkish diplomat argued with some satisfaction, ended the ‘temporary interruption’ of ‘our traditional foreign policy’ based on nonintervention and adherence to the status quo.¹ And yet the next three years, corresponding to the tenure of Tansu Çiller as prime minister, witnessed an unprecedented upsurge in activism abroad. In the space of just eleven months — from March 1995 to February 1996 — Turkey launched a series of military operations into Iraq, came close to carrying out an incursion into Iran, concluded a veritable alliance with Israel, got involved in a coup attempt in Azerbaijan, and came to the brink of war with Greece. These episodes are notable for a number of reasons. First, they illustrate vividly the impasse that had been reached by the mid-1990s, as new security imperatives arising primarily (but not exclusively) from exogenous social dynamics at home generated policies that ran counter to the dominant strategic culture paradigm, including an expansion of offensive military capabilities, a more aggressive posture toward some regional states, and a willingness to enter into exclusive alliances with others. Second, they reveal the interplay of the contending Republican and Imperial paradigms in shaping policy behavior, encouraging certain courses of action and constraining others. And third, they highlight the centrality of statecraft in its various dimensions — not just spirit, but judgment and vision as well — in determining the quality of responses to new security challenges.