Analyticity in Externalist Languages

  • Gillian Russell
Part of the New Waves in Philosophy book series (NWIP)


I am going to argue for a different way of thinking about the analytic/synthetic distinction (ASD). The view that I will present is complicated in some respects and it makes reference to unfamiliar entities, and so my strategy in arguing for it will be that of Bertrand Russell in ‘On Denoting’: I will present a number of puzzles for the traditional account of the ASD, and argue that my account can solve them all.


Direct Reference Traditional Account Competent Speaker Epistemic Property Modal Definition 
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© Gillian Russell 2010

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  • Gillian Russell

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