Duty, Goodness, and God in Thomas Reid’s Moral Philosophy

Abstract

What did Reid say about how considerations of moral duty and well- being should motivate an agent? And how did he think of the relationship between virtue and well-being? My purpose in this essay is to explore these questions, paying special attention to a pair of claims that Reid defends. The first is that considerations of duty should have motivational priority over those of well-being. The second is that virtue and well-being necessarily coincide. Reid’s defense of the first claim, I contend, consists in a multi-layered argument against rival eudaimonist views that builds upon Butler’s arguments against Hobbesian egoism. I further suggest that this anti-eudaimonist polemic provides important clues as to why Reid also found utilitarianism wholly unattractive. Reid’s defense of the second claim, which concerns the coincidence between virtue and well-being, also has several dimensions, including an appeal to the claim that one cannot achieve a significant degree of well-being apart from having the virtues. I suggest that its deepest component, however, is an appeal to a species of moral faith that emphasizes the moral importance of trust in divine benevolence.