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International Relations Theory Meets International Law

  • Ruchi Anand

Abstract

This chapter explores three characteristics of the international system and their impact on the functioning of international law. Each of these characteristics, namely anarchy, balance of power and polarity, is rooted in neorealist theory and is particularly relevant to understand the implicit logic of self-defense in international relations.

Keywords

Foreign Policy International Relation International System World Politics International Politics 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Ruchi Anand 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ruchi Anand
    • 1
  1. 1.American Graduate School of International Relations and DiplomacyParisFrance

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