Abstract
Most people think they have an obligation to obey the law. They think the mere fact that a particular action is required by law gives them a reason to behave in that way. This popular view of law has provoked considerable academic discussion. The influential legal theorist, H. L. A. Hart, responds to the popular view by positing a systematic distinction between legal and moral obligation.1 He suggests that we have a distinctive obligation to obey the law, regardless of its moral character. This line of argument has not been without its critics. Perhaps the most prominent dissenter from Hart’s view on this point has been Joseph Raz, one of Hart’s distinguished former students. Raz denies that we have any generic obligation to obey the law; whatever obligations we have to obey specific legal rules depends upon their moral content.2
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982 ) pp. 147–161, 262–268.
J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) chapter 12.
See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp. 254–255; Raz, The Authority of Law, pp. 50–58.
E. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998) p. 15 [hereinafter OBBE].
H. Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. M. L. Andison ( New York: Philosophical Library, 1946 ) pp. 167–186.
R. Bernasconi, ‘The Third Party: Levinas on the Intersection of the Ethical and the Political’, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 30 (1999) 76–87, 76–77.
Compare J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 ) p. 154.
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. A. Wedberg ( New York: Russell and Russell, 1961 ) p. 115.
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, trans. M. Hartney ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991 ) p. 256.
Compare L. L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart’, Harvard Law Review 71 (1958) 630–672.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2009 Jonathan Crowe
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Crowe, J. (2009). Levinasian Ethics and the Concept of Law. In: Manderson, D. (eds) Essays on Levinas and Law. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234734_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230234734_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-30043-3
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-23473-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)