Abstract
Recent political developments in Europe, in particular the rejection of the European Constitution in France and in the Netherlands in 2005, are leading to soul searching about the future of the European Union. There can be little doubt that these developments signal distrust towards further political integration in Europe.
Previous versions of this chapter were presented during seminars at Sciences Po, Paris, at the London School of Economics, at the Universities of Genoa, Macerata and Siena, at the European University Institute, Florence and at CESifo, Munich. I am grateful to Helge Berger, Elisabetta Croci Angelini, Francesco Farina, Marc Flandreau, Franco Praussello, Francesco Saraceno,Waltraud Schelkle, An Sibert, Cezary Wójcik, Patrizio Tirelli and Frédéric Zumer for comments and criticism.
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© 2009 Paul De Grauwe
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De Grauwe, P. (2009). Some Thoughts on Monetary and Political Union. In: Talani, L.S. (eds) The Future of EMU. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230233898_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230233898_2
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