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Three Debates in Meta-Aesthetics

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New Waves in Aesthetics

Part of the book series: New Waves in Philosophy ((NWIP))

Abstract

Few philosophical debates seem to allow for as little theoretical disparity as that on the subject of Realism or Anti-Realism. That the two antithetical positions uphold the broad structure of a dichotomy may come as no surprise: the question under scrutiny is, after all, one about whether the world and its contents are autonomous of our minds, or whether the world and its contents simply cannot be said to exist independently of our perception and understanding of them. There does not, in other words, seem to be much leeway between the two stances, at least partly because what they capture is a deeply entrenched conceptual divide over what does and does not exist.1 How, one may ask, could some thing exist but a little?

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Authors
  1. Elisabeth Schellekens
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Sussex, UK

    Kathleen Stock (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy) (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy)

  2. Oberlin College, USA

    Katherine Thomson-Jones (assistant professor) (assistant professor)

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© 2008 Elisabeth Schellekens

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Schellekens, E. (2008). Three Debates in Meta-Aesthetics. In: Stock, K., Thomson-Jones, K. (eds) New Waves in Aesthetics. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230227453_9

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