Configuring the Cognitive Imagination

  • Jonathan M. Weinberg
Part of the New Waves in Philosophy book series (NWIP)


My goal here is to advocate for a naturalistic theory of the imagination that concerns the ways that different parts of our mind can be configured to interact with the imagination. This account will serve as a framework for investigating a range of imaginative phenomena of interest to aestheticians, including genre, imaginative blockage, and the range of conative states we take on in engaging with various fictions. But to tell this story about how the imagination interacts with various parts of the mind, I first need to tell the tale of what those parts are, and indeed what the imagination is such that it makes sense to talk about such interactions.


Moral Psychology Folk Psychology Experimental Philosophy Explanatory Resource Fictional World 
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© Jonathan M. Weinberg 2008

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  • Jonathan M. Weinberg

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