Determinants of the Capital Level of Banks in Hong Kong

  • Jim Wong
  • Ka-Fai Choi
  • Tom Pak-Wing Fong
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)


Banks incorporated in Hong Kong generally maintain a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) well above the regulatory requirement.1 For example, the average CAR of licensed banks was 28.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2004, against an average required minimum of just 10.3 per cent.2 This phenomenon is also common in other economies.3 It raises the question of what factors determine the actual amount of capital held by banks and, specifically, whether changes in regulatory requirements can affect the level of bank capital.4


Banking Sector Capital Requirement Large Bank Small Bank Capital Ratio 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Jim Wong, Ka-Fai Choi and Tom Pak-Wing Fong 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jim Wong
  • Ka-Fai Choi
  • Tom Pak-Wing Fong

There are no affiliations available

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