Abstract
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because ‘tis easy for them to know each other’s mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning of the whole project. But ‘tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou’d agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and wou’d lay the whole burden on others (David Hume [1739–1740] cited in Hardin, 2003: 3).
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© 2007 Grant Jordan and William A. Maloney
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Jordan, G., Maloney, W.A. (2007). The Collective Action Paradox: What Incentives Induce Participation? Olson Defied?. In: Democracy and Interest Groups. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230223240_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230223240_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-41453-6
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-22324-0
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)