Abstract
In this chapter I will identify and examine several common criticisms levelled at virtue ethics. One of the aims of this chapter is to consider whether a strong, i.e., action-guiding version of virtue ethics is plausible.
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Notes
R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 36.
J. Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 3rd edn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999).
See, for example: W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).
P. Benn, Ethics (London: UCL Press, 1998), p. 170.
M. Lessnoff, Social Contract (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988)
D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
P. Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 29–30.
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© 2007 Alan E. Armstrong
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Armstrong, A.E. (2007). Common Objections to Virtue Ethics. In: Nursing Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230206458_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230206458_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-35316-3
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