Abstract
One of the biggest challenges facing Japan and the United States is to incorporate China into the global community as a responsible and constructive member. This has been a long-held policy objective for the two countries, especially Japan. Since the 1970s, Japan has sought to make China economically affluent, politically stable, friendly, and engaged with the outside world. The U.S.-Japan alliance was one of the two main methods of pursuing this objective; economically engaging China was the other. This policy, which I call liberal deterrence, combines elements of deterrence, economic interdependence, and security interdependence.1 Liberal deterrence allowed Japan to realize its policy goals vis-a-vis China. In pursuing this goal, Japan expected the U.S.-Japan alliance to serve three functions: to deter China’s aggressive behavior, alleviate the security dilemma, and induce good behavior from China.
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Notes
“Liberal deterrence” is similar to Dale Copeland’s “realistic engagement.” Dale Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and the Future of U.S.-China Relations,” in G. John Ikenberry and Michaels Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). Security interdependence, which is an important element in my “liberal deterrence,” is absent from his model.
Richard Samuels describes Japan’s grand strategy as a Goldilocks strategy that seeks a middle ground between hard and soft power, as well as between Beijing and Washington. Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). Here, I am arguing that the need for a combination of soft and hard approaches comes from China’s nature.
On the Yoshida doctrine as a basis for Japan’s constructive engagement policy toward China, see Michael Jonathan Green, “Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 152, 158.
It is also important for the potential aggressor and the deterrer to share an understanding of the situation. The threat should be credible and consequence of compliance and aggression should be clearly communicated and understood. On deterrence, see, for example, William W. Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence,” in William Kauffmann, ed., Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956).
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
On the increased pacifying effect of economic interdependence through guaranteed trade, see Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” International Security, 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 5–41.
Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2006).
Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 226–254.
Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics, 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 1–24.
In Japan, a perception of monolithic threat of communist had changed by the mid-1970s. The 1976 Defense White Paper argues that “The People’s Republic of China, long desiring to reinforce its military power has recently attempted a remarkable improvement and modernization of equipment. The immediate concern of the Chinese is with the Soviet Union; therefore their attempts at modernization are believed to be aimed at affecting an improved state of readiness against Soviet forces.” Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1976, p. 21.
By 1977, the Defense Agency concluded “the restoration of a Sino-Soviet ‘monolithic’ threat is hardly conceivable.” Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1977, p. 33.
For example, the 1970 version of the Defense White Paper used the term “Communist China” and wrote that China was the only country in Asia developing nuclear weapons. Boeicho, Nihon no Boei [Defense Agency, Defense of Japan], October 1970, 29.
For example, the United States and China had joint facilities in western China to monitor Soviet missile tests and China increased its exports of rare metals to the United States. Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 120.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2009 (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2009), p. 382.
Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1992, p. 48.
Ministry of Defense, “Jieitai no Shorai Taisei ni tsuite (2)” [The Future Structure of the SDF (2)], document submitted to the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, May 15, 2009, 3, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei2/dai9/gijisidai.html (Accessed July 1, 2009)
Nicholas D. Kristof, “An Asian Mini-Tempest over Mini Island Group,” The New York Times, September 16, 1996, A8.
For example, after Sedney’s 2009 remark, the U.S. government reassured the Japanese government of its defense commitments of the Senkaku Islands and Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Takeo Kawamura disclosed the U.S. reassurance to the press. “Senkaku Shoto ni Anpo Joyaku Tekiyou, ‘Bei Seifu no Kakunin Eta,’ Kanbo Chokan” [Security Treaty Applies to Senkaku Islands, “Received Confirmation from the U.S. Government,” Chief Cabinet Secretary] Nikkei Shimbun, March 6, 2009, 2. One source of the problem is the three-part official position of the United States: (1) The Senkaku Islands are under Japan’s administrative control; (2) Article V of the Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands; (3) The United States does not take a position on the question of the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. The U.S. position is sensible as a set of three, but U.S. officials have sometimes mixed up the parts or stated only one of the three, inviting confused reactions from Japan and China. On the official U.S. position, see “State Department Noon Briefing,” March 24, 2004, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/March/20040324170337xjsnommis0.4507105.html (Accessed July 2, 2009); Larry A. Niksch, “Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relationship and Obligations,” CRS Report for Congress, Order Code 96–798, September 30, 1996.
Nicholas D. Kristof, “Would You Fight for These Islands?” The New York Times, October 20, 1996, Section 4, 3.
Many studies have claimed that a mere absence of conflict cannot be identified as a success of deterrence. See, for example, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models,” American Political Science Review, 87, no. 1 (March 1993): 61–73.
The security dilemma worsens under certain conditions, such as when it is difficult to differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons and when offense is dominant. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214.
For example, Thomas Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 49–80.
Hua Guofeng’s remark during a press conference in Tokyo, May 1980. Asahi Shimbun, May 30, 1980.
Hua Xin, “Defense Budget Stirs Controversy,” Beijing Review, January 19, 1987, 11–12.
Liu Jun, “Military Budget a Blow to Peace,” Beijing Review, January 18–24, 1988, 14.
Wang Jianwei and Wu Xinbo, Against Us or with Us?: The Chinese Perspectives of America’s Alliance with Japan and Korea, Asia-Pacific Research Center, May 1998, 27.
Liu Xiaoguang, “Ping Riben Fangweiding ‘Zhangguang Zhishi’,” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [Assessing the Directive of the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, World Economy and Politics], no. 3 (1988): 48–49. The Japanese government abolished the 1% ceiling on December 30, 1986. Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet agreed on “Plans for dealing with the Immediate-term Defense Build-up Program authorized by the Cabinet on November 5, 1976 and included in the FY 1987 budget.”
For example, Wang Shuzhong, “Riben Zouxiang Hefang,” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [“Where Is Japan Going?” World Economy and Politics], no. 1 (1988): 33.
Liu Xiaoguang, “Riben Kuajun zhong de Meiguo Yinsu,” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [“U.S. Factor in Japan’s Military Buildup,” World Economy and Politics], no. 9 (1988): 45–46.
Deng Xiaoping at a press conference during his visit to Japan, quoted in “Kisha Kaiken no Yoshi” [Summary of the Press Conference], Asahi Shimbun, October 26, 1978, 3.
Mao Zedong, quoted in Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 1062.
Also cited in David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989–2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), p. 67.
Qian Qichen, Waijiao Shi Ji [Ten Stories of a Diplomat Qian Qichen] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi: 2003), p. 195.
For example, the United States and China exchanged intelligence on the situation in Kampuchea and Afghanistan. There was a significant cooperation between the United States and China in supplying mules and arms to the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The United States (CIA) paid the costs, and Chinese intelligence supplied the weapons. For more on the cooperation, see James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York: Knopf, 1999), pp. 136–137.
Between 1984 and 1987, nine seismographic monitoring sites were set up to monitor Soviet underground tests. Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 635–636.
Shi Yinhong, a professor of international studies at People’s University in Beijing explains the impact of war on Iraq on China’s behavior: “The Iraq war has brought a change. Before Iraq, there was a stalemate in the Chinese position, and fragmentation. Now there is some recognition of a possible time sequence in the U.S. approach to North Korea, and that has created a sense of urgency in China.” Robert Marquand, “Bush’s ‘Preemptive Strike’ Policy Spurs Beijing into Preemptive Diplomacy,” Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0408/p01s03-woap.html (Accessed July 20, 2009)
On China’s halting of oil supply, see, for example, Murray Hiebert, Jay Solomon, and Charles Hutzler, “A Global Report: U.S. Plans to Sanction Pyongyang for Missile Sale—Washington Raises Pressure as China Works to Damp Potential Action in U.N.,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2003, A9.
Benjamin Kang Lim, “China Appears to Be Trying to Rein in North Korea,” Reuters, March 31, 2003. The Chinese government did not disclose the cut-off and told U.S. counterparts that it was due to “technical difficulties.” The U.S. government believed that the halt contributed to North Korea agreeing to the talks. “U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN) Holds Hearing on Relations with China,” Political Transcripts by Federal Document Clearing House, September 11, 2003.
National Institute for Defense Studies, ed., “China—In Search of New Thinking,” East Asian Strategic Review 2004 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2004), http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/pdf/east-asian_e2004_04.pdf (Accessed July 20, 2009)
President Bush stated his disapproval of Taiwan’s planned referendum at his meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao. Bush told the press: “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.” “President Bush and Premier Wen Jiabao Remarks to the Press,” The Oval Office, December 9, 2003, http://george-bush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031209–3.html (Accessed July 20, 2009). For details on Japan’s actions on this matter, see, for example, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference 6 January 2004,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2004/1/0106.html (Accessed July 15, 2009); Hirotsugu Tamura, “Chin Soto no Shin Kenpo Jumintohyo Gendo ‘Yuryo’ Nihon, Taiwan ni Moshiire” [Japan Tells ‘Concern’ of President Chen’s Actions on New Constitution and Referendum], Asahi Shimbun, December 30, 2003, 3; Philip Yang, “Higashi Ajia no Kozo Hendo to Nittai Kankei no Saihen” [Structural Change in East Asia and Reorganization of Japan-Taiwan Relations], in Shin Kawashima, Urara Shimizu, Yasuhiro Matsuda, and Philip Yang, eds., Nittai Kankei Shi 1945–2008 [Japan-Taiwan Relations 1945–2008] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009).
Guojia Tongjiju, ed., Zhongguo Tongji Zhaiyao 2007 [China Statistical Abstract] (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji, 2007). According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, the figure was as high as about 80% in 2005. “Chugoku no Taigai Boeki Izondo, 80% he Sekai Saiko” [China’s Trade Dependency Approaches 80%, World Highest], People’s Daily Online, September 10, 2005. http://j.peopledaily.com.cn/2005/09/10/jp20050910_53424.html (accessed July 10, 2009)
Anthony Faiola and Zachary A. Goldfarb, “China Tops Japan in U.S. Debt Holdings,” Washington Post, November 19, 2008, D01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/18/AR2008111803558.html (Accessed July 20, 2009)
Anthony Faiola, “China Worried about U.S. Debt: Biggest Creditor Nation Demands a Guarantee,” Washington Post, March 14, 2009, A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/13/AR2009031300703.html (Accessed July 20, 2009)
For example, Feng Zhaokui advocated China buy Japanese yen to raise the price of yen as a form of sanction against Japan. “Liu Zhuanjia Tan Zhongguo Ruhe Jing Ibu Fanzhi Riben” [Six Specialists Discuss How China Increases Countermeasures against Japan], Huanqiu Shibao, September 20, 2010, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2010–09/1113543.html (Accessed September 22, 2010)
On arguments behind the changes in Japan’s ODA policy to China, see Shigeyuki Iwaki, “Taichu ODA Minaoshi Rongi” [Debates on Reviewing the ODA to China], Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan [National Diet Library], no. 468 (February 18, 2005)
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© 2011 Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato
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Ueki, C. (2011). Liberal Deterrence of China: Challenges in Achieving Japan’s China Policy. In: Inoguchi, T., Ikenberry, G.J., Sato, Y. (eds) The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230120150_8
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