Conclusion

Abstract

The biggest problem in conflict control, according to Boulding (1962, pp. 325–326) is “catching conflict young.” Conflict situations often develop into unmanageable proportions before appropriate action is taken to resolve them by peaceful means. Thus, the two greatest issues of conflict control are signal detection—recognizing when something needs to be done; and implementation—knowing what to do. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama interpreted the signals of anti-American terrorism and veered in different directions by implementing alternative conflict resolution strategies. Were their choices wise? In retrospect, one can find different scenarios of decision points—selecting a certain conflict resolution strategy or shifting to another one—that might have altered the contours of anti-American terrorism development, such as what if Clinton had settled on a problem-solving approach rather than a conflict avoidance strategy early in the conflict escalation period when the al Qaeda issue was largely confined to domestic politics in Saudi Arabia during the first half of the 1990s? What if Bush had focused exclusively on fighting the al Qaeda enemy rather than enlarging adversary scope to include the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, at a time, prior to the U.S. intervention, when Islamic extremism was simply not a part of Iraqi politics?