Nuclear Safety: Resisting Unintended Consequences

Abstract

In the enlargement context, the definition of nuclear safety was substantially extended. This created high pressure for new formal regulation. In the Copenhagen framework some assistance was provided, in particular for the decommissioning of plants, but the main focus was on monitoring because of the regulatory nature of nuclear safety, which aims at controlling nuclear installations. Fostered by unintended consequences, namely, a ruling by the ECJ that confirmed formal Commission competences on the matter, the member states fiercely objected to any extension of Commission capacities. They succeeded against the expressed support by all EU institutions since the Euratom Treaty still operates on purely intergovernmental rules. Finally, a dominant non-state actor organization expressed heavy opposition. In so doing it represented an alternative response to binding EU rules in alliance with some decisive national governments. Given that a vast informal acquis already existed before enlargement, functional pressure pushed the Commission to go beyond the existing cooperation and left little option but to frame the policy in terms of hard regulatory policies, backed by the ECJ ruling confirming Commission competences.