Abstract
The last Russian army unit left Grozny on New Year’s eve 1996, and of course we were euphoric. Maskhadov had won the elections and the Russian President had sent a letter of congratulations that recognized him as Chechnya’s President. From now on all of our outstanding issues were to be resolved through negotiation and compromise, or so we thought. Chechens expected that their lives would return to normal; that there would be reconstruction, employment, and security. People thought that the deprivations of the war were over and a more stable and secure future was at hand, and they expected the government to provide a framework for the attainment of these goals.
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Notes
Berezovsky has confirmed giving the money to Shamil in an interview with IWPR. Tom DeWaal, “Berezvosky Blames Putin for Chechen War,” IWPR Caucasus Reporting Service, October 31, 2002. Ivan Rybkin, the secretary of the Security Council at the time has maintained that Berezovsky always behaved in accordance with Russian government policy. See Ivan Rybkin interview on Radio Station Ekho Moskvy August 20, 1997, http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/12458/
For details concerning the work of the commission, see Ivan Rybkin, Consent in Chechnya, Consent in Russia (London: Litton Trading and Investment LTD, 1998) p. 81.
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© 2010 Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lanskoy
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Akhmadov, I., Lanskoy, M. (2010). Maskhadov’s Impossible Quandary. In: The Chechen Struggle Independence Won and Lost. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230117518_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230117518_5
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