Still the Driving Force of European Integration?

Abstract

The Federal Republic of Germany has always been very much committed and very reliable in supporting European integration, acting as an important driving force toward this achievement. During the past decades, the further enhancement of the European unification process has become Germany’s reason of state, based on a broad consensus among the political elite and the public as well (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2006, 466–488). Even the 1990 German reunification did not change this EU-friendly attitude. In the more recent past, however, some observers have noticed a certain “pragmatization” of Germany’s EU policy (Schmalz 2001, 62–68). This hypothesis suggests that Berlin is now pursuing its own national interests more clearly and that Germany’s efforts for a further deepening of the integration are declining. In this context, it should also be noted the German government’s evident refusal to still act as “Europe’s paymaster.” Indeed, time seems to be running out for a position where the “necessary compromises were possible because Germany paid for them,” as the former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder put it (as quoted in Der Spiegel No. 1/1999). However, supporters of the pragmatization thesis must take into consideration the huge amount of money the unified Germany has needed—and still needs—for overcoming its former division.