The Neoconservatives and Clintonism, 1993–1995



In 1995, Zalmay Khalilzad warned that the United States had been operating without a grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. This had pushed the Clinton administration into “a reactive mode,” which meant it was “squander[ing] a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity … to shape the future.”2 Clinton failed to define what America’s national interest actually consisted of. He deferred dogmatically to the UN and America’s allies; he pursued excessive and paralyzing multilateralism; and he failed to set down criteria for the effective use of force, resulting in an ad hoc and inconsistent American policy that was damaging to America’s global credibility.3 The fact that he gave only four major foreign policy speeches in the first eight months of his presidency appeared to indicate a new unwillingness to invest significant energy in foreign affairs.4


Foreign Policy Peace Process Heritage Foundation Agree Framework Ballistic Missile 
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