The Pre-9/11 Years


In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, neoconservatism became the “cause célèbre. of international politics.” The ideology of neoconservatism was, it seemed, the intellectual justification for the Bush administration’s new “war on terror.”2 A number of influential neocons served in, or as advisors to, the Bush administration, and it became apparent that these neoconservatives had lobbied for many of the policies now being pursued under the aegis of a “war on terror” several years before the 2001 terrorist attacks that catalyzed them.3 As Robert Kagan observes in the quotation prefacing this introduction, neoconservatism had provided “something to come back to.”


Foreign Policy Terrorist Attack Global Strategy Moral Ideal Single Pole 
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© Maria Ryan 2010

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