The International Dynamics of a Nuclear India

Abstract

Serious questions arise on the benefits to India of going overtly nuclear in May 1998. There had already existed a state of opaque or existential deterrence between India and its neighbors, China and Pakistan, and whether the 1998 nuclear tests make deterrence any more robust is questionable. Like the general concept of nuclear deterrence, India’ declared policy of minimum deterrence remains a chimera. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1172 passed in June 1998 is unprecedented insofar as it urges India and Pakistan to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a demand that cannot be supported by international law. If India’ decision to go nuclear may lack strategic, political and economic benefits, there are even more serious flaws underlying the NPT and CTBT that have not been addressed. The U. S. policy of aggressively pursuing its missile defense program further complicates this international state of affairs. It is unfortunate that India, which earlier opposed the global arms race, has now come out in support of the U. S. program.