Abstract
This chapter analyzes the case of Japan’s foreign aid policy on the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project. Japan suspended disbursment of the aid in retaliation to the test firing of a Taepodong–1 missile by North Korea in August 1998, and later resumed it in the face of U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, South Korean) pressure. This series of events provided a rare case, in which Japan showed an aggressively opposite stance from that of the United States over a security issue. Whereas Japan was insisting on postponing the KEDO project, the United States advocated proceeding with the KEDO as originally scheduled. The different responses of Japan and the United States caused by the Taepondong–1 missile incident provide an interesting case with which to examine the making of Japanese foreign policy and the role of U.S. pressure in that process.
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Notes
For the detailed discussion on the concept of economic statecraft, see David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
Dennis T. Yasutomo, The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), 25–30.
George H. Bush, National Security of the United States, 1990–1991 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1990), 32
Tai Ming Cheung, “Checking for Bombs: Doubts Persist over Pyongyang’s NuclearPlans,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 May 1992, 20.
Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 127–128.
Sheryl Wudunn, “North Korea Fires Missile over Japanese Territory: Parts of Rocket Fell on Either Side of Japan,” New York Times, 1 September 1998, A6.
Steven Lee Myers, “Missile Test by North Korea: Dark Omen for Washington,” New York Times, 1 September 1998, A6.
Masaaki Ono, “KEDO no mezasu mono to wa nani ka,” Gaiko Forum, September 1999, 52.
For details on Kim Dae-Jung’s perspective on the basic policy framework toward North Korea and future reunification, see Kim Dae-Jung Peace Foundation for the Asia-Pacific Region, Kim Dae-Jung heiwa toitsu ron [Kim Dae-Jung’s “three-stage” approach to Korean reunification: Focusing on the South–north confederate stage] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 2000).
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© 2001 Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato
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Sakai, H. (2001). Continuity and Discontinuity of Japanese Foreign Policy toward North Korea: Freezing the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in 1998. In: Miyashita, A., Sato, Y. (eds) Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230107472_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230107472_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-38681-9
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