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National Security Letters and Diminishing Privacy Rights

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The Impact of 9/11 and the New Legal Landscape

Abstract

Imagine you are a small-town librarian on the executive board of a nonprofit consortium of about twenty-five public libraries in Iowa. One day two agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) come to see you at work. After you greet them, they hand you a two-page letter, over official letterhead, stating that “Under the authority of Executive Order 12333, dated December 4, 1981, and pursuant to Title 18, United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 279,” you must provide to the FBI “subscriber information, billing information, and access logs of any person or entity related to” a specific Internet protocol address for a forty-five-minute period on June 3, 2008. You quickly realize that you are being asked, under authority of law, to disclose the private information of a patron using a library computer in your consortium. As you read on, you see that the letter says that a “Special Agent in Charge” has signed it and certifies that the “information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” The letter, somewhat ominously, “advises” you that you cannot tell anyone that the FBI is seeking the information.1

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Notes

  1. Christopher P. Banks, “Protecting (or Destroying) Freedom through Law: The USA Patriot Act’s Constitutional Implications,” in American National Security and Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, ed. David B. Cohen and John W. Wells (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 29.

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  2. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the FBI’s Use of National Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), 9; Laura K. Donohue, The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 237.

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  3. Courts generally rule that subpoenas issued by governmental agencies are constitutional if they are reasonable in scope and application. The information sought must be substantially connected to the agency’s regulatory interest and be deemed an appropriate subject of inquiry. They are subject to judicial review, before or after their issuance, under the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard, which makes them different from national security letters. Donahue, The Cost ofCounterterrorism, 236. See also David M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics: Civil Rights and Liberties (Volume Two), 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton&Company, 2008), 939–942.

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  4. Michael J. Woods, “Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A Practical History of USA Patriot Act Section 215,” National Security Law and Policy 1 (2005): 37

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  5. Charles Doyle, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background and Recent Amendments (Updated March 28, 2008) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 2–3

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  6. Donahue, The Cost of Counterterrorism, 223, lists the following as examples: the NSA’s Operation SHAMROCK and Project MINARET; the CIAs Operation CHAOS; and the Army’s Operation CONUS. See also David Coleand Tames X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security (New York: The New Press, 2002).

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  7. Brian T. Yeh and Charles Doyle, USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005: A Legal Analysis (Updated December 21, 2006) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006).

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  8. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of National Security Letters (March 2007), 120. “Counterterrorism” investigations apply to efforts stopping terrorist threats to the homeland, whereas “counterintelligence” operations are designed to stop infiltration of government’s intelligence programs by those who seek to discover or undermine them. See Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 113.

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© 2009 Matthew J. Morgan

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Banks, C.P. (2009). National Security Letters and Diminishing Privacy Rights. In: Morgan, M.J. (eds) The Impact of 9/11 and the New Legal Landscape. The Day that Changed Everything?. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230100053_7

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