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Household Welfare in Iran Under Banking Sanctions: From Open Economy Toward Autarchy

  • Mohammad Mohammadi Khabbazan
  • Mohammad Reza Farzanegan
Chapter

Abstract

Over the last three decades, the role of economic sanctions in foreign policy has rapidly expanded (Institute for International Economics 2002). Economic sanctions are non-military measures that aim to change a target state’s behavior (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007). Some analysts argue that economic sanctions are incapable of achieving their goals, because they have no real influence on the target economy’s rulers (Drezner 1999; Elliott 1998; Hufbauer et al. 1990; Pape 1997). Others suggest that whereas sanctions may have a relatively high chance of success in the immediate period after their implementation (Dizaji and van Bergeijk 2013), over time, the target economy is likely to adjust to the imposed constraints by reallocating its resources (see Chap.  8; Dizaji and van Bergeijk 2013; Siddig 2011).

Keywords

Exchange Rate Rural Household Welfare Loss Total Export Total Import 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mohammad Mohammadi Khabbazan
    • 1
  • Mohammad Reza Farzanegan
    • 2
  1. 1.Cluster of Excellence “Integrated Climate System Analysis and Prediction” (CliSAP) & Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability (CEN)University of HamburgHamburgGermany
  2. 2.Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, School of Business & EconomicsPhilipps-Universität MarburgMarbugGermany

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