Changing Budgeting Administration in International Organizations: Budgetary Pressures, Complex Principals and Administrative Leadership

  • Ronny Patz
  • Klaus H. Goetz
Part of the Public Sector Organizations book series (PSO)


This chapter combines insights from Comparative Public Administration (CPA) and International Relations (IRs) to explain change in the administrative organization and procedures of budgeting in international organizations (IOs). Such changes are typically triggered by budgetary pressures, but the form they take is decisively influenced by the constellation of principals and the reactions of administrative leaders. International public administrations (IPAs) often confront non-unified, complex principals that send ambiguous budgetary signals to the administration. Depending on whether administrative leaders are guided by budget-maximizing or bureau-shaping motivations, different adaptations in administrative structures and procedures for budgeting and resource mobilization result. We illustrate our argument with reference to three UN agencies, ILO, UNESCO and WHO.


United Nations International Labour Organization Voluntary Contribution Resource Mobilization Budget Process 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ronny Patz
    • 1
  • Klaus H. Goetz
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceLudwig-Maximilians-UniversityMünchenGermany

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