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Challenges to the US Rebalance to Asia

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Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of America’s past bipartisan strategy of engagement with China and the worry that neither the state nor Chinese behavior was being transformed as intended. It then describes the Obama administration’s initial efforts to deepen engagement and the resulting assessment that this was not producing the desired change in Chinese behavior either. Obama’s “pivot” to Asia reflects the recognition of that policy’s failure and the need to bolster US power and presence in the region to meet Chinese ambitions. The final section of the chapter provides a road map of diplomatic, economic, and military policies necessary for the USA to carry out the rebalance effectively, while also noting specific challenges to doing so.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    1. The three most important statements announcing the policy of rebalancing were: White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament; Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/; and US Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2012, www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf

  2. 2.

    2. For an overview of the engage but hedge policy, see Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011), 264–284.

  3. 3.

    3. For an account of China’s stalled liberalization, see Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

  4. 4.

    4. For a detailed account of US arms sales to Taiwan, see Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 (CRS Report No. RL30957) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf

  5. 5.

    5. The text of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 can be found at www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html. An annual Pentagon report to Congress in 2010 stated the obvious: “The balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainland’s favor.” See US Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2010, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf

  6. 6.

    6. See Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” NBR Analysis 16, no. 4 (2005): 5–14. www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/vol16no4.pdf

  7. 7.

    7. Zoellick, ibid.

  8. 8.

    8. Jay Solomon, “Clinton Puts China Focus on Economy, Not Human Rights,” Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB123530531124541761

  9. 9.

    9. White House, “Remarks by the President at the U.S./China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” July 27, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-US/China-Strategic-and-Economic-Dialogue

  10. 10.

    10. Mark Lynas, “How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the Room,” Guardian, December 22, 2009, www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas

  11. 11.

    11. See Phillip C. Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security,” Strategic Forum 281 (2013): 4, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-281.pdf

  12. 12.

    12. For an overview of this change under Xi Jinping, in particular, see François Godement, “Xi Jinping’s China,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2013, www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR85_XI_JINPING_CHINA_ESSAY_AW.pdf

  13. 13.

    13. Xi Jinping, “Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia” (Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Shanghai, May 21, 2014), www.china.org.cn/world/2014-05/28/content_32511846.htm; and “Hillary Clinton: Pacific ‘Big Enough for All of Us,” Telegraph, November 15, 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/9679778/Hillary-Clinton-Pacific-big-enough-for-all-of-us.html

  14. 14.

    14. Quoted in Paul M. Kennedy’s The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism: 1860–1914 (New York: Humanity Books, 1980), 241.

  15. 15.

    15. Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 2.

  16. 16.

    16. Quoted in Timothy A. Walton’s “Are We Underestimating China’s Military?” National Interest, May 19, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-we-underestimating-chinas-military-10479

  17. 17.

    17. Remarks made by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at an ASEAN meeting in 2010. Quoted in John Promfret, “U.S. Takes A Tougher Tone with China,” Washington Post, July 30, 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html

  18. 18.

    18. Ty Cobb, “The Defense Strategic Guidance: What’s New? What Is the Focus? Is It Realistic?” National Security Journal (Harvard Law School), January 8, 2012, http://harvardnsj.org/2012/01/the-defense-strategic-guidance-whats-new-what-is-the-focus-is-it-realistic/

  19. 19.

    19. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, 1. See also, Ashley J. Tellis, Balancing without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), 2, and Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, Revising US Grand Strategy Toward China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2015), 5–6.

  20. 20.

    20. See Roger Cliff, “Anti-Access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy: Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” RAND Corporation, January 27, 2011, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT354.pdf

  21. 21.

    21. White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament

  22. 22.

    22. According to congressional testimony given by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of US Naval Operations, the cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act “would result in a ‘2020 Fleet’ of about 255–60 ships.” And the “Navy would not increase presence in the Asia-Pacific … [which] would largely negate … our plan to rebalance to the Asia Pacific region directed by the DSG.” Quoted in Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RL32665) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 19, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf. For an example of the limited presence now possible under the current US Navy force structure, see Thomas Donnelly, “The Pathetic Pacific Pivot,” Weekly Standard, December 22, 2014, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/pathetic-pacific-pivot_822008.html

  23. 23.

    23. See Aaron Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia (New York: IISS, 2014), 100, no. 20. As Friedberg notes, in Admiral Jonathan Greenert and General Mark Welsh’s “Breaking the Kill Chain,” (Foreign Policy, May 17, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/17/breaking-the-kill-chain/), “In a brief discussion of states that might employ A2/AD capabilities, Greenert and Welsh mention Iran, North Korea and Syria but not China.”

  24. 24.

    24. For an overview of what militarily will be required, see Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle, 133–52; Dan Blumenthal, “The U.S. Response to China’s Military Modernization,” in Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s Military Challenge, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 309–342; and Mark E. Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing”’ Toward Asia (CRS Report No. R42448) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 10–16, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/187389.pdf

  25. 25.

    25. Lyle Goldstein, “Beijing Confronts Long-Standing Weakness in Anti-Submarine Warfare,” China Brief (Jamestown Foundation), 11, no. 14, www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38252&no_cache=1#.VBBOexD5dyI

  26. 26.

    26. See White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon,” November 15, 2012, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepared-delivery; and White House, “Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” March 11, 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisor-president-united-states-an

  27. 27.

    27. On the importance of TPP, see Manyin et al., “Pivot to the Pacific?,” 22–23; Tellis, Balancing without Containment, 47–50; and Gary J. Schmitt, “A Hard Look at Soft Power in East Asia,” AEI, June 19, 2014, 10, www.aei.org/publication/a-hard-look-at-soft-power-in-east-asia/

  28. 28.

    28. Michael Mazza and Gary Schmitt, “Turn Gas into Geostrategy,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303753904577456392934098120

  29. 29.

    29. For an assessment of the agreement, see Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” Diplomat, May 2, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/

  30. 30.

    30. See Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle, 94; and Ely Ratner, “China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 141, March 13, 2014, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/Hearing%20Transcript_March%2013%2C2014_0.pdf

  31. 31.

    31. “Asia-Pacific,” Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org/regions/asia-pacific#.VBBryBD5dyI

  32. 32.

    32. On this point and the analysis that follows, see Gary J. Schmitt, “Facing Realities: Multilateralism for the Asia-Pacific Century,” in The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition, ed. Gary Schmitt (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 91–111.

  33. 33.

    33. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, “America’s Global Image Remains More Positive Than China’s” July 18, 2013, www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-more-positive-than-chinas/; and Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, “Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture” June 23, 2015, www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/23/global-publics-back-u-s-on-fighting-isis-but-are-critical-of-post-911-torture/

  34. 34.

    34. Tellis, Balancing without Containment, x.

  35. 35.

    35. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Hillary Clinton: ‘Failure’ to Help Syrian Rebels Led to the Rise of ISIS,” Atlantic, August 10, 2014, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/hillary-clinton-failure-to-help-syrian-rebels-led-to-the-rise-of-isis/375832/

  36. 36.

    36. “Obama Reaffirms US-Japan Defense Commitment,” Voice of America, April 24, 2014, www.voanews.com/content/obama-senkaku-islands-fall-under-usjapan-defense-treaty/1899996.html

  37. 37.

    37. For example, see note 24 and Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s remarks in 2012 that the rebalance was “not about any single country or group of countries.” He added, “It is not about China, it’s not about the United States. It’s about a peaceful Asia-Pacific region”—leaving one to ask why all the military steps he outlines in the speech are necessary to keep the region peaceful if no one country is putting that stability at risk. See Carter, “The U.S. Strategic Balance to Asia: A Defense Perspective,” (speech, New York City, August 1, 2012), www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1715

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Schmitt, G.J. (2016). Challenges to the US Rebalance to Asia. In: Huang, D. (eds) Asia Pacific Countries and the US Rebalancing Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-93453-9_3

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