Abstract
The Republic of Macedonia (RM) expressed its interest in building a strategic partnership with the USA. It invested in this partnership by supporting the war in Iraq, despite criticism from the EU and others opposed to the war. RM also enacted other policies contrary to the EU’s position to support the USA. In return, the USA agreed to “oppose any attempt by any party to the use of force or threat against the territorial integrity of Macedonia.” The USA defends the security and stability of Macedonia against external threats, but does not support democratization and political reform to the same extent. The stability of the country is much more important than its democratization. This chapter analyzes this dichotomy of US foreign policy toward Macedonia.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Ivo Daalder, & Michael E. O’Hanlon, “The United States in theBalkans: There to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2000, pp. 157–170.
- 2.
Kiro Gligorov, Macedonia is all we have, Skopje, Kultura, 2002, p. 500.
- 3.
It is interesting to note that on December 25, 1991, the day of the official breakup of the USSR, the US recognized the 14 new states that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A similar practice was applied in relation to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, when, on January 1, 1993, the date of dissolution, the US recognized the new states Slovakia and Czech Republic. Recognition of the states that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia was handled differently, probably because of the military conflicts that resulted.
- 4.
In the process of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the European Community (EC) created the so-called “Badinter Commission,” composed of five top officials (presidents or judges of constitutional courts) in their countries, whose task was to determine and propose to the EC which members of the federation were eligible for recognition. The commission submitted a recommendation that only Slovenia and Macedonia should be recognized. Despite this proposal, the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia and a few months later, under pressure from the US, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized too. Thus, the EC showed disregard for the decisions of the body it had itself created. It is obvious that the EC and the US were driven by considerations of real politik.
- 5.
Jonathan Paquin, Recognizing the Obvious? The United States Response to Secessionist Ambitions since the End of the Cold War, Ottawa, Published Heritage Branch, 2006, p. 443.
- 6.
Ivo Daalder & Michael E. O’Hanlon,Op. Cit., pp. 157–170.
- 7.
It should be noted that the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not help the country, which was facing an internal conflict, nor did it minimize the Serbian influence on the conflict.
- 8.
In that period, Risto Nikovski was an undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia and later ambassador to Great Britain, Albania, and the Russian Federation.
- 9.
Risto Nikovski, The role of the US in Macedonia’s Troubled Journey to International Recognition (1991–2013), Canada, Risto Stefov Publications, 2014, p. 19.
- 10.
Ibid., pp. 27–30.
- 11.
Risto Nikovski, Op. Cit., pp. 39–41.
- 12.
Kiro Gligorov, Op. Cit., p. 501.
- 13.
John Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and rebels in the Balkans, Skopje, Foundation Open Society Institute, 2009, p. 63.
- 14.
Ibid., p. 58.
- 15.
The immediate reason for the introduction of the trade embargo by Greece was the adoption of the new national flag, which contained the star of Vergina, a symbol that can be found on the tomb of Philip of Macedonia, father of Alexander the Great. The move was seen by the Greek authorities as a falsification of the history of Greece and a direct provocation. This event brought Greek nationalist passions to a boiling point and dimmed hopes for a quick resolution of the conflict.
- 16.
It was also when the Democratic candidate for US President, Bill Clinton, was elected. However, the change of political party in the White House did not result in a major transformation of US policy toward Macedonia. Like the previous government, the Clinton administration pointed to the importance of regional stability to justify its nonrecognition of the Republic of Macedonia. As time went on, and as a result of the expansion of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that threatened to spread to other parts of the region, the US interest in the region grew.
- 17.
John Phillips, Op. Cit., p. 59.
- 18.
Risto Nikovski, Op. Cit., p. 24.
- 19.
John Phillips, Op. Cit., p. 58.
- 20.
After this move, the US established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Macedonia at the ambassadorial level, upgrading its relations office to an embassy in February 1996. This decision was made after both sides had shown a clear commitment to respect each other and make efforts to find a solution to the “name issue.”
- 21.
Christos Nikas, “The Effects of the Interim Accord on the Economic Relations Between Greece and FYROM”, in Kofos, Evangelos & Vlasidis, Vlasis, Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995–2002), Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2005, pp. 89–125.
- 22.
John Phillips, Op. Cit., p. 62.
- 23.
Zidas Daskalovski, Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia 1989–2004, Chapel Hill, NC, Globic, 2005, p. 83.
- 24.
Stojan Slaveski, National Security of the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic integration, Skopje, Digiprint, 2003.
- 25.
James Pardew was appointed special envoy of the US president and played an important role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. He had previous experience of negotiations in Dayton, when the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina was discussed.
- 26.
Zidas Daskalovski, Op. Cit., p. 103.
- 27.
Ibid., p. 111.
- 28.
Jolyon Naegele, Macedonia: Government, International Community Outraged by OSCE Envoy, RFE/RL, May 25 2001, available at http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article (accessed on January 27, 2015).
- 29.
Matthew Nimetz, “Agreement was achieved, now we need a new Agreement”, Dnevnik, March 3, 2008.
- 30.
George Bush, “Macedonia is entering into NATO”, Utrinski, April 1, 2008.
- 31.
An interesting statement was made by Deputy Secretary of State Daniel Fried at the Washington press conference on the Bucharest NATO summit. Responding to the observation of a Greek journalist that the “Macedonian language,” is “so called,” Fried said, “I do not think the language is ‘so-called’ as the Macedonian language exists. There are Macedonians. As you know, the Macedonian language is taught at the State Department. All languages are human creations, they are developed and codified. Therefore, there is a Macedonian language. Sure, there is a historic Macedonian province, which is something different from the state. And that’s important. It is clear that the government in Skopje, as we Americans call the government of Macedonia, has no aspirations. We recognize the difference between the historical territory of Macedonia, which is certainly greater than the state. And we support the process of finding a solution to the name led by mediator Matthew Nimetz”. http://www.komarec.com.mk/poveke.php?id=1393 (accessed on January 20, 2015).
- 32.
Philip T. Reeker, “Hard decisions must be taken by yourself”, Nova Makedonija, January 10, 2012.
- 33.
Macedonia. http://daily.mk/vesti/chikago-treba-da-e-posleden-samit-bez-proshiruvanje-veli-hilari-2 (accessed on January 20, 2015).
- 34.
Paul D. Wohlers, “You are capable you need a courage”, Vest, January 9, 2015.
- 35.
Statement of Jess Baily, Ambassador-Designate to the Republic of Macedonia, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 17, 2014.
- 36.
Denko Maleski, “We are becoming country that can infect neighbors”. Weekly Globus, N. 387, 30.09.2014 see: http://globusmagazin.mk/?ItemID=C273876EBAB652468CB3BD477A7B52F4 (accessed on January 20, 2015).
- 37.
According to a survey on global leadership in the US in 2013, 48% of Macedonians approved, 19% disapproved, while 33% refused to answer (The US–Global Leadership Project, A Partnership between the Meridian International Center and Gallup 2013).
- 38.
John Phillips, Op. Cit., p. 191.
- 39.
Mieczyslaw Boduszyński & Kristina Balalovska, “The Battle over Article 98”, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 51, No. 1, January/February, 2004, pp. 18–30.
- 40.
Kiro Gligorov, Op. Cit., p. 501.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2016 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Slaveski, S., Popovska, B. (2016). Effects of US Foreign Policy on Democratic Processes in the Republic of Macedonia: Between Liberalism and Realism. In: Burt, S., Añorve, D. (eds) Global Perspectives on US Democratization Efforts. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58984-2_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58984-2_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-58983-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-58984-2
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)