Chapter 1: Pragmatism in Wittgenstein Before On Certainty

Boncompagni, Anna

doi:10.1057/978-1-137-58847-0_2

Chapter 1: Pragmatism in Wittgenstein Before On Certainty

Anna Boncompagni³

Chapter
First Online: 03 December 2016

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Part of the book series: History of Analytic Philosophy ((History of Analytic Philosophy))

Abstract

With the scope of elucidating what Wittgenstein might have had in mind when, in On Certainty, he spoke of pragmatism as a thwarting Weltanschauung, Chapter 1 examines all the occasions before that work in which Wittgenstein explicitly wrote or said something about pragmatism. Ample space is given to the first mention of pragmatism to appear in Wittgenstein’s writings, in a remark from 1930, largely neglected in the literature, concerning the pragmatist conception of truth. Some considerations are advanced regarding the possible sources of Wittgenstein’s idea of pragmatism, particularly with reference to the work of Peirce and James. The author highlights the role of Frank Ramsey and argues that there are good reasons for retaining that, beyond James’ writings, Wittgenstein also read some articles by Peirce.

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Notes

1.
I must thank David Stern for the reconstruction of these passages, on which the literature is not always clear.
2.
The translations from the Nachlass are mine (except where specified differently), but I am indebted to Joachim Schulte for his precious suggestions. When the text also appears in published works, I usually adopt the existing translation, unless specified otherwise.
3.
In Boncompagni (forthcoming a), I work on this note by contextualizing it within the relationships between pragmatism, analytic philosophy and phenomenology. See also Misak (2016, Chap. 7).
4.
As is well known, there is a debate in the Wittgensteinian literature concerning the translation of the term ‘Satz’ as ‘proposition’ or as ‘sentence’. Here I will generally use ‘sentence’ when Wittgenstein seems to refer to ordinary language, and ‘proposition’ when he seems to refer to logic and phenomenological language. Yet one should bear in mind that Wittgenstein uses the same word, and not two words, for both aspects.
5.
See Marion (1998, pp. 129–131), Stern (1995, Chap. 5), Engelmann (2013a, Chap. 1).
6.
Wenn ich sage ‘dort steht ein Sessel’, so hat dieser Satz Bezug auf eine Reihe von Erwartungen. Ich glaube ich werde dorthin gehen können, den Sessel befühlen und mich auf ihn setzen können, ich glaube er ist aus Holz und ich erwarte von ihm eine gewisse Härte, Brennbarkeit etc. Wenn gewisse dieser Erwartungen getäuscht werden so werde ich dies als Beweis dafür ansehen daßdort kein Sessel gestanden ist./Hier sieht man den Zugang zu der pragmatistischen Auffassung von Wahr und Falsch. Der Satz ist solange wahr solang er sich als nützlich erweist.
7.
The relevance of this early remark in the development of Wittgenstein’s thought towards a pragmatic viewpoint is even clearer if one considers PI, §80 as a middle step: here, again, Wittgenstein makes the example of the chair and applies it to the theme of the rules for the use of words. In the following remark, PI, §81, Ramsey’s idea of logic as a normative science (an idea Ramsey probably derived from Peirce) is also evoked. Both passages are already in MS 142 (1936).
8.
The editors of BEE will include the correct transcription in the next edition of the Nachlass. The facsimile of MS 107 was recently added to the Wittgenstein Source website and can be freely accessed on line by browsing www.wittgensteinsource.org.
9.
The passage is also mentioned in Scharfstein (1980, pp. 20, 400n4) and Upper (1998), both of whom cite Bogen (1972), and in Fabbrichesi (2002, p. 20), who cites Upper (1998).
10.
It is interesting to see the manuscript on this point: before the expression ‘hypothetische Element’ there is a ‘p’, or perhaps ‘pr’, crossed out; one could speculate that Wittgenstein was about to write ‘pragmatische Element’ and changed his mind.
11.
Die Erwartung sagt gleichsam‘schön ist es auch anderswo und hier bin ich sowieso’. Und mit dem Perspektiv der Erwartung schauen wir in die Zukunft./Es hat keinen Sinn von Sätzen zu reden die als Instrumente keinen Wert haben./Der Sinn eines Satzes ist sein Zweck.
12.
Plisch und Plum, published in 1882; see Busch (1974).
13.
Cf. PR, §15c, modified translation. The sentence ‘Its meaning is its purpose’ is in English in the original text.
14.
Wittgenstein himself explains this in MS 107, p. 227; see also von Wright (1993, pp. 492–493).
15.
Note written on 4 February 1930; then in PR, §228d and in BT, p. 94.
16.
See also LCL, pp. 53, 66, 82, 110, and LCM, pp. 55, 59. The theme is also in BT: see in particular section 32.
17.
Wittgenstein told Russell about this in a letter (see McGuinness 2012, p. 172). This text is published in English in Venturinha (2010). The theme of the infinite in mathematics was a central topic in the discussions between Ramsey and Wittgenstein: see Wrigley (1995), Marion (1998).
18.
See Thayerm (1981, Chap. 2), Sahlin (1995); for a more critical approach see Glock (2005), McGuinness (2006).
19.
Among the rich literature on Ramsey and pragmatism, two recent contributions (both focused on Peirce’s influence) are Tiercelin (2015) and Misak (2016).
20.
See Ramsey (1990).
21.
Glock (2005, p. 48) is an exception.
22.
As stated in Wittgenstein’s preface to PI.
23.
See also LCL, p. 119, LCM, p. 90. On general propositions, see also James, PP, p. 963.
24.
In Weyl (1921). See Sahlin (1990, p. 240n6) and (1995, p. 153), Majer (1991, p. 169n15), Glock (2005, p. 50), Price (2011, p. 155), Marion (1998, pp. 86–87) and (2012, pp. 71 ff.).
25.
See also BT, p. 62 (sec. 18).
26.
Wittgenstein discusses the same three approaches, as we shall see, during a lecture in the early 1930s.
27.
On the impact of this work on Ramsey see Acero (2005).
28.
From Peirce’s ‘The Fixation of Belief’, also in CP 5.365.
29.
Other affinities between the two can be identified in the perspective of redundancy; see Koethe (1996, pp. 135 ff.).
30.
See Goodman (2002), Boncompagni (forthcoming c).
31.
Except for an indirect testimony according to which he referred to an example from P during a conversation, in 1941; see PPO, pp. 388–389.
32.
It is possible that Wittgenstein had read PP even earlier: Ramsey already knew James’ psychological work at least by 1929. See Ramsey (1991b, p. 76). See Biesenbach (2014, pp. 265 ff., 564, 682 ff.) for a systematic presentation of Wittgenstein’s citations and allusions to James.
33.
As Hookway (2012, p. 194) notices, Peirce’s view on the connection between pragmatism and metaphysical aspects is exactly the opposite.
34.
See, for instance, P, p. 32; MT, pp. 3, 112.
35.
See Putnam, A.R. and Putnam, H. (1992); Putnam (1997); Cormier (2002); Marchetti (2015a, Chap. 4).
36.
In particular, in On Truth he cites MT and P (Ramsey 1991a, pp. 15n12; 24n3; 94n15).
37.
Originally published with the title ‘Professor James’ Pragmatism’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1907–1908.
38.
James’ influence is evident in particular in The Analysis of Mind, 1921. In this work Russell does not deal with the pragmatist conception of truth, except for a passage in which he states that pragmatists wish all truth to be ‘practical’ (1921, p. 165). Interestingly, referring more generally to pragmatism, he affirms (1921, p. 26) that the three founders of this philosophy were James, Dewey and Schiller, without mentioning Peirce at all. Yet, from Russell (1946) (cited in Nubiola 1996) we know that he read CLL. See also Misak (2016) for a description of Russell’s partial ‘conversion’ to pragmatism.
39.
See Russell (1910). The first article appears here with a different title, ‘William James’ Conception of Truth’. That Wittgenstein read this book is documented in von Wright (1974, p. 10).
40.
See ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’, W 3, pp. 242 ff., CP 3.358 ff.
41.
See ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life’, CP 1.161 ff. More on this in Chap. 6, Section ‘Beyond Method’.
42.
In ‘Critical Analysis of Logical Theories’, ca. 1902; CP 2.7. See also Bergman (2010), to whom I owe this quote.
43.
Besides Peirce, James himself agrees with utilitarianism on the relevance of practical aspects (P, p. 32), but he adopts a more cautious attitude when it comes to utilitarianism as a theory for moral life (WB, pp. 155 ff.). Dewey too both praises and criticizes utilitarianism in Chapter VII of Reconstruction in Philosophy (Dewey 1948); see also Chapter VI on the intertwinement between logic, practice, and usefulness.
44.
On this topic see Engelmann (2013a, pp. 67 ff.)
45.
Ramsey’s manuscripts are available on-line on the University of Pittsburgh archive website, www.library.pitt.edu/frank-p-ramsey-papers. The paper I refer to is titled ‘Peirce, Chance, Love and Logic’ and is in Box 5, Folder 30. On Peirce and Ramsey, see Hookway (2005) and Misak (2016); on Ramsey as a channel between Peirce and Wittgenstein see also Nubiola (1996).
46.
The quote is from CLL: 102; the same article was also published in volume II of CP in 1931 and in SW in 1940 (W 3, p. 304, CP 2.690, SW, p. 187). Rhees would return to these themes in 1970, see Rhees (2003, p. 73 ff.).
47.
Also in W 3, p. 23 and CP 5.375.
48.
Also in W 3, p. 273 and CP 5.407. See also CLL, p. 105 (CP 2.693, W 3, p. 305). On Peirce’s conception of truth see Misak (2004).
49.
Again, like Ramsey; cf. Ramsey (1991a, pp. 33–34).
50.
Originally in MS 113, p. 33r - without ‘(Pragmatism)’ -, then in MS 114, p. 158.
51.
See Boncompagni (forthcoming b).
52.
On use and usefulness, see Chap. 4, Section ‘Meaning and Understanding’. On the difference between the two concepts in pragmatism and in Wittgenstein, see Schulte (1999) and Moyal-Sharrock (2007, p. 171).
53.
BT, section 55; PI, §§466–470. Note that something similar resurfaces in OC, §474.
54.
MS 117, p. 4; RFM, pp. 37–38.
55.
On ‘useful’, ‘usable’ and ‘used’ see Bouveresse (1987, p. 573).
56.
On Sraffa and Wittgenstein, see Engelmann (2013b).
57.
See LPP. The ‘psychological’ manuscripts are those from MS 130 to MS 138, the typescripts are TS 229 and 232. Parts of these writings were later published in RPP, LS and PPF. For a wide-ranging analysis of the manuscripts, prior to their publication, see Schulte (1993).
58.
MS 131, p. 70. The remark is then in TS 229, p. 252 and TS 245, p. 184 and finally published in RPP I, §266 (I quote from the published version).
59.
See also LPP, pp. 145, 266, and a similar point in RPP I, §§635–636.
60.
The lines that follow are in RPP II, §390.
61.
See the opening paragraphs of ‘William James’ Conception of Truth’, in Russell (1910).

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Boncompagni, A. (2016). Chapter 1: Pragmatism in Wittgenstein Before On Certainty . In: Wittgenstein and Pragmatism. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58847-0_2

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