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Researching the Political Economy of Regulation at the Local Level: Theoretical and Methodological Issues

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The Political Economy of Local Regulation

Part of the book series: Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy ((PEPP))

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Abstract

This chapter aims to outline some theoretical and methodological issues that originate when researching the political economy of regulation at the local level. First, the chapter discusses the rationales and motivations for undertaking research on the political economy of local regulation. We will discuss, then, more specific research issues that relate to the definition of regulatory performance, to the explanation for the performance of regulatory systems, and to the design of regulatory systems. After indicating the kind of methodological approaches that researchers can follow, we will conclude by reviewing the results that are expected from research in this area of inquiry.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. SOAS University of London, London, UK

    Alberto Asquer

Authors
  1. Alberto Asquer
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. SOAS University of London, London, United Kingdom

    Alberto Asquer

  2. Turin School of Local Regulation and Foundation for the Environment, Torino, Italy

    Franco Becchis

  3. Turin School of Local Regulation and Foundation for the Environment, Torino, Italy

    Daniele Russolillo

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Asquer, A. (2017). Researching the Political Economy of Regulation at the Local Level: Theoretical and Methodological Issues. In: Asquer, A., Becchis, F., Russolillo, D. (eds) The Political Economy of Local Regulation. Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58828-9_3

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