Abstract
This conclusive chapter summarizes the main findings of the book and their theoretical and empirical implications. It recalls that different degrees of independence for the regulators do not seem to influence enforcement in the field of competition policy: states establish independent NCAs as a “shortcut” to improve their credibility, but this move is apparently not effective. The chapter suggests how existing theories of regulation could be reconsidered in light of these findings. In particular, regulatees (and not just political systems) should be taken into account, and the importance of formal independence should not be overestimated.
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Guidi, M. (2016). Conclusions. In: Competition Policy Enforcement in EU Member States. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58814-2_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58814-2_6
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Online ISBN: 978-1-137-58814-2
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