Introduction

Abstract

Despite an increasing awareness of the welfare of animals, and an evolving interest in animal minds, animals are still treated, by and large, merely as resources for human use. Practices involving animals—such as factory farming, entertainment, and experimentation—demonstrate a general view of animals as objects, rather than as subjective individuals who have awareness of themselves and of their own experiences. On the one hand, it is fairly easy to recognize another self when we interact with dogs, cats, or other companion animals. Most people would not deny that their dog or cat is someone, rather than just something. This is because there seems to be something unique to interacting with another creature that has a mind, and we are able to recognize that individual as someone that shares certain traits with us. Dan Zahavi (2005), in his examination of selfhood, writes, “What must be realized is that bodies of others differ radically from inanimate objects, and that our perception of these minded bodies is unlike our ordinary perception of objects.” (155). For him, the experience we have when we interact with another is distinctive as we experience behaviour as an expression of a mind. This is what allows for empathy, where we are able to feel or imagine our way into the experiences of others, and which motivates us to treat them with moral consideration and care. But even when we do treat certain animals with care and consideration, we tend to turn away from and dismiss the cruel treatment of other animals from a failure to acknowledge inconsistencies in our own beliefs and actions. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on our emotions to consistently guide us towards the ethical treatment of all animals, as emotional connections are based mainly on direct encounters with others. This means that we need also to take into consideration rational reasons for believing that most animals are in fact self-aware, without relying solely on experience or emotion for such beliefs.