Dual Intergovernmental Transformation for Market Development

  • Jinhua Cheng
Part of the Governing China in the 21st Century book series (GC21)


Based on the preceding literature review, this chapter theorizes the main thesis of this book, that is, the model of "Dual Intergovernmental Transformation for Market Developemnt" (DITMD), and explains the meaning of this new framework. It argues that while decentralization may promote governmental incentives to preserve markets, it also incurs tremendous transaction costs in markets. In order to take advantage of economic benefits of decentralization and also avoid its disadvantages at the same time, this chapter further designs the DITMD model to allocate the state’s coercive powers appropriately in order to sustain market development, theoretically.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jinhua Cheng
    • 1
  1. 1.KoGuan Law SchoolShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiChina

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