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The Development of a Latent Capability to Produce Nuclear Weapons, 1945–59

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Abstract

This chapter describes the development of a basic nuclear research infrastructure in Sweden between 1945 and 1959, and explains how the build-up of nuclear weapons research was integrated into the civilian nuclear power programme. In addition, this chapter analyses the arguments made by the military as to why Sweden needed nuclear weapons and the strategy used to convince the politicians to move in that direction.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    About nuclear latency, see Scott D. Sagan (2010), “Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Nonproliferation”, in W. Potter, and G. Mukhatzhanova (eds.), Forecasting nuclear proliferation in the 21st century. Volume I, The role of theory (Stanford Security Studies, Stanford).

  2. 2.

    S. Meyer (1986), The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 41.

  3. 3.

    Meyer did not investigate Swedish expertise himself; instead, he based his work on a 1972 essay by Jerome Garris, which in turn was not based on what the FOA was doing but on open sources. See Jerome Henry Garris, ‘Sweden and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, paper from the Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar (2002), p. 207, footnote 3.

  4. 4.

    A. Peterson, ‘Vad visste man i Sverige om atombomben före den 6 augusti 1945?’ (What Was Known in Sweden about the Atomic Bomb before August 6, 1945?), Polhem, 14, 1996, 233–63.

  5. 5.

    B. Lindell, Damokles svärd. Strålningens, radioaktivitetens och strålskyddets historia, del 2 (Damocles sword. Radiation, Radioactivity, and Radiation Protection History, Part 2) (Stockholm: Atlantis, 1999), pp. 13–14.

  6. 6.

    Lindell, Damokles svärd, pp. 442–3. According to some historians, the gender factor was the reason why Lise Meitner did not receive the Nobel Prize, see Ruth Lewin Sime, ‘From Exceptional Prominence to Prominent Exception: Lise Meitner at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Chemistry’. Ergebnisse 24 Forschungsprogramm Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus (2005), http://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/KWG/Ergebnisse/Ergebnisse24.pdf Accessed 1 January 2016; Elisabeth Crawford, Ruth Lewin Sime and Mark Walker, ‘A Nobel Tale of Postwar Injustice’, Physics Today, 50 (9), 26–32, 1997.

  7. 7.

    Lindell, Damokles svärd, p. 441.

  8. 8.

    Lindell, Damokles svärd, p. 83.

  9. 9.

    A. Petterson, ‘Vad visste man i Sverige om atombomben före den 6 augusti 1945’ (What was known in Sweden about the atomic bomb before August 6, 1945?), (Göteborg: Svenska nationalkommittén för teknikhistoria, 1983).

  10. 10.

    W. Agrell, Svenska förintelsevapen: utvecklingen av kemiska och nukleära stridsmedel 1928–1970 (Lund: Historiska media, 2002), p. 46.

  11. 11.

    Agrell, Svenska förintelsevapen, p. 47.

  12. 12.

    Lindell, Damokles svärd, pp. 111–12.

  13. 13.

    The Torsten Gustafson–Tage Erlander letters can be found in the Labour Movement Archive and Library (Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek), ‘Tage Erlander’, Stockholm.

  14. 14.

    Lundquist, N., ‘Försvarets forskningsanstalt – organisation i ständig utveckling’ (The Swedish National Defence Research Institute – a constantly developing organization) in Försvarets forskningsanstalt 1945–1995 (Stockholm, 1995), p. 7.

  15. 15.

    Lundquist, ‘Försvarets forskningsanstalt—organisation i ständig utveckling’, p. 8.

  16. 16.

    Fröman, A., ‘Kärnvapenforskning’ (Nuclear Weapons Research), in Försvarets forskniningsanstalt 1945–1995 (Stockholm, 1995), p. 162.

  17. 17.

    Fröman, ‘Kärnvapenforskning’, p. 162.

  18. 18.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, secretariat, incoming documents 1946 E III a, H 62, FOA Archive (FOA).

  19. 19.

    The basis of the report by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, Svensk kärnvapenforskning 1945–1972 (Swedish Nuclear Weapons Research, 1945–1972), headed by Olof Forssberg (hereinafter, ‘Olof Forssberg’s study (basis)’, p. 5 et seq.

  20. 20.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 5 et seq.

  21. 21.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 5 et seq.

  22. 22.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, Report on the operations at the Swedish National Defence Research Institute department 1. From 1 April 1945 to 30 June 1946H 188/05, FOA.

  23. 23.

    Agrell, Svenska förintelsevapen, pp. 51–3.

  24. 24.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 7.

  25. 25.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 7.

  26. 26.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, Report on the operations at the Swedish National Defence Research Institute department 1, during fiscal year 1946–47, together with a proposed programme for continued operations H 144/47, FOA.

  27. 27.

    Bill 1946:120, 285.

  28. 28.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 8.

  29. 29.

    A memo dated 7 January described various methods of producing heavy water. Lund researcher Lamek Hulthén, who wrote the report, thought that it would be possible to develop Ljungaverket’s electrolysis operation to reach a higher level of production. Although the capital cost would be great and it would take a long time to set up the plant, in purely technical terms the problem was solved, so it was claimed.

  30. 30.

    Assignments were given to other research institutions. For example, Adolf Eriksson, Associate Professor at the University of Uppsala, would perform theoretical calculations of neutron diffusion (how the velocity and density of the neutrons is affected), and Lamek Hulthén, researcher at the University of Lund, would calculate the critical mass for a uranium 235 bomb and a plutonium bomb. Swedish National Defence Research Agency, memo no. 3 concerning work on the uranium question, H 42/8509, FOA.

  31. 31.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 9.

  32. 32.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 9.

  33. 33.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, ‘Verksamhetsberättelse för budgetåret 1947/48’ (Annual report for fiscal year 1947/48), H 158/48FOA.

  34. 34.

    Agrell, Svenska förintelsevapen, pp. 54–5.

  35. 35.

    On the concept of ‘total defence’ in Swedish military organization, see P. Lundin, N. Stenlås and J. Gribbe (Eds.) Science for Welfare and Warfare. Technology and State Initiative in Cold War Sweden (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2010).

  36. 36.

    ‘Vårt framtida försvar—Överbefälhavarens förslag’ (Our Future Defence—The Supreme Commander’s proposal) (Stockholm: Nordstedts Press, 1947).

  37. 37.

    Agrell 1985, Alliansfrihet eller atombomber, pp. 72–3.

  38. 38.

    von Sydow, Kan vi lita på politikerna?, p. 38.

  39. 39.

    U. Bjereld, A. W. Johansson and K. Molin, Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred. Svensk utrikespolitik under kalla kriget (Sweden’s security and world peace. Swedish foreign policy during the Cold War) (Stockholm: Santérus Press, 2008), p. 29.

  40. 40.

    W. Agrell, Fred och fruktan. Svensk säkerhetspolitisk historia 1918–2000 (Swedish National Security Policy History 1918–2000) (Lund, Historisk media 2000), p. 87.

  41. 41.

    Bjereld et al., Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred, p. 67.

  42. 42.

    Agrell, Alliansfrihet eller atombomber, p. 82.

  43. 43.

    ‘Vårt framtida försvar—Överbefälhavarens förslag’ (‘Our Future Defence—The Supreme Commander’s proposal’) (Stockholm 1947).

  44. 44.

    D. Holloway, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War in Europe’ (Unpublished paper, June 2010). See also, D. Holloway, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962’, in O. A. Westad and M. Leffler, (Eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) pp. 376–97.

  45. 45.

    ‘Vårt framtida försvar—Överbefälhavarens förslag’.

  46. 46.

    Proposition 1948, 206, 119.

  47. 47.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 11.

  48. 48.

    B. Wittrock and S. Lindström, De stora programmens tid—forskning och energi i svensk politik (The Big Programs Time—Research and Energy in Swedish Politics) (Stockholm, 1984), p. 55.

  49. 49.

    Lindström 1991, Hela nationens tacksamhet, p. 92.

  50. 50.

    K. Larsson, ‘Kärnkraftens historia i Sverige’ (1987).

  51. 51.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, 8 October, 1948, ‘P. M. rörande medelsbehovet för budgetåret 1949/50 under reservationsanslaget till viss forskningsverksamhet’ (Memo concerning the need for funds for the fiscal year 1949/50 under the reservation grant to certain research activities), H 186, FOA.

  52. 52.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, Secretariat, Outgoing documents 1949 B IV, vol. 5, H 37:-1 (appendix), FOA.

  53. 53.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, 13 June 1949, ‘Redogörelse över verksamheten inom Aktiebolaget Atomenergi under 1948 och program för bolagets fortsatta arbete’ (Report on activity in Akitebolaget Atomenergi during 1948 and programme for the continued work of the company), H 4012–2091, FOA.

  54. 54.

    ‘Diskussionsunderlag vid överläggning med Överdirektör Björkeson och Professor Ljunggren den 26 februari 1949’ (Discussion paper for consultation with the Director General Björkeson and Professor Ljunggren 26 February 1949) by Sigurd Nauckhoff, 26 February 1949, H 37:1. FOA.

  55. 55.

    ‘Överenskommelse’, (The Agreement), H 129, 30 October 1950, FOA.

  56. 56.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 18.

  57. 57.

    Interview with Bengt Pershagen, 5 October, 2001.

  58. 58.

    Interview with Professor Emeritus Jan Rydberg, 8 November 2001. Olof Forssberg’s study (Basis), pp. 15–17.

  59. 59.

    On the practical implications for different so-called ‘Direct-usable Fissile Materials’, see Bremer Maerli, M., ‘Managing Excess Nuclear Materials in Russia’, 49–51, in J. Krause and A. Wenger (Eds.), Nuclear Weapons into the 21st Century. Current Trends and Future Prospects, Studies of Contemporary History and Security Policy, vol. 8 (2001).

  60. 60.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, Incoming documents 1948 E III a, vol. 4, H 35, FOA.

  61. 61.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, Outgoing documents 1948 B IV, vol. 4, H 35:2, FOA.

  62. 62.

    High-purity graphite was being tested by ASEA and by Skandinaviska grafitindustriaktiebolaget.

  63. 63.

    It was estimated that it would take 2 years to set up the mining and production operation, 5–10 years to produce 500–1000 tons of uranium at a production capacity of 100 tons per year, and 1 year to produce bombs ready for use.

  64. 64.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, Outgoing documents 1948 B IV, vol. 4, H 35:2, FOA.

  65. 65.

    On the Scandinavian defence union, see G. Aalders, ‘The Failure of the Scandinavian Defence Union, 1948–49’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 15 (1) 12, 1990; Kersti Blidberg, Just Good friends. Nordic Social Democracy and Security Policy 1945–1950 (Oslo: Forsvarshistorisk forskningscenter, Forsvarets hogskole, 1987); E. Noreen, Brobygge eller blockbildning: De svenska och norska utrikesledningarnas säkerhetspolitiska föreställningar 1945–1948 (Stockholm. Carlssons förlag, 1994).

  66. 66.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, ‘Produktionskapacitet och lager av atombomber och radioaktiva stridsmedel’ (Production Capacity and Stocks of Atomic Bombs and Radioactive Weaponry), 1950–10–09, H 4022–2092. The importance of Sweden being prepared for a nuclear weapons attack was stressed in a memorandum about American and Russian production of atomic bombs by Sigvard Eklund, dated 27 March 1950. Swedish National Defence Research Institute H 2267–2092, FOA.

  67. 67.

    ‘Produktionskapacitet och lager av atombomber och radioaktiva stridsmedel’, H 4022–2092, FOA.

  68. 68.

    Bill 1950:1, appendix 6, SU 4, rskr. 4.

  69. 69.

    Bill 1952:120, SU 172, rskr. 331.

  70. 70.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, ‘Förslag till arbetsprogram FOA 2F 1951/52 och 1952/53’ (Proposed work programme for department 2 of the Swedish National Defence Research Institute), H 4007–209/51, FOA.

  71. 71.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, August 1952, ‘Kortfattad redogörelse för forskningsverksamheten vid FOA 1 under budgetåret 1951/52’ (Brief report on the research activity at the Swedish National Defence Research Agency department 1 during fiscal year 1951/52). See ‘Bifogat: förteckning över viktiga rapporter och skrifter m. m. från FOA 1 under 1951/52’; also see attached list of reports and publications etc. from the Swedish National Defence Research Agency department 1 during 1951–52), H 183-0013/1 28, FOA.

  72. 72.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, ‘Redogörelse för verksamheten vid Försvarets forskningsanstalt under budgetåret 1950/51’ (Report on activity at the Swedish National Defence Research Institute during fiscal year 1950/51), H 2253/51, FOA.

  73. 73.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, Department 4, Office, Incoming and outgoing secret documents 1953F, vol. 4, H 4017–1, FOA.

  74. 74.

    Swedish National Defence Research Agency, ‘Preliminär utredning av betingelserna för framställning av atombomber i Sverige’ (Preliminary investigation of the conditions for the production of atomic bombs in Sweden), 1953–03–05H 4011–2092, FOA.

  75. 75.

    It is interesting to note that Israel was considering the same approach. During the 1950s, Norway and Israel were negotiating for the sale of heavy water for the Israeli Dimona reactor. The agreement signed in 1959 meant that a big step had been taken toward producing Israeli nuclear weapons. See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 33–34, 60–62, 83, 87.

  76. 76.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), p. 26 et seq. The authors of the joint communication were the Chairman of AK, County Governor Malte Jacobsson, the Managing Director of AE, Harry Brynielsson and the Secretary of AK, Gösta Funke. Other appointees were: Professors Hannes Alfvén, Torsten Gustafson, and The Svedberg, Director Erik Bengtson and Colonel Torsten Schmidt.

  77. 77.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 33.

  78. 78.

    ‘Aktiebolaget Atomenergi, årsredovisning 1953’ (Annual Statement 1953).

  79. 79.

    ‘Pm angående arbeten med plutonium inom sektionen för kärnkemi’, av Erik Haeffner 13 februari 1955, H-pärm II, 171–260, (Memorandum about work with plutonium in the Section of Nuclear Chemistry by Erik Haeffner, 13 February 1955), Direktionsarkivet, Studsvik AB (DA).

  80. 80.

    Aler, Bo, ‘Atombombers verkan mot olika mål’ (The effects of atomic bombs on different targets), 28 May 1953, Swedish National Defence Research Agency H 4024–2092, FOA.

  81. 81.

    See, for example, Bo Aler, ‘Om initieringen av en atombomb’ (On the triggering of an atomic bomb), 6 November 1953, Swedish National Defence Research Agency H 4049–2092, FOA.

  82. 82.

    Svensk atomenergipolitik, pp. 17–18; Larsson, ‘Kärnkraftens historia i Sverige’, 131. Erik Svenke discussed different methods of producing uranium and Swedish uranium policy in a lecture ‘Svensk uranhistoria’ (Swedish history of uranium) at the National Museum of Science and Technology in Stockholm, 14 November 2000.

  83. 83.

    Interview with Karl-Erik Larsson September 22, 2000; See also Maja Fjæstad, Sveriges första kärnreaktor—från teknisk prototyp till vetenskapligt instrument, (Sweden’s first nuclear reactor—from a technical prototype to scientific instrument) SKI-report 01:1 (Stockholm, 2001), p. 38.

  84. 84.

    Interview with the former head of the Department of Physics at AB Atomenergi Bengt Pershagen, November 16, 2000. About the construction of R1, see S. Eklund, ‘Den första svenska atomreaktorn’, (The first Swedish atom reactor) Kosmos, 1954, 32.

  85. 85.

    ‘Föredragning för försvarsledningen 26/4 1954 ang möjligheterna att tillverka en atombomb i vårt land’ (Speech to the defence command on 26 April 1954 on the possibilities of producing an atomic bomb in our country), April 26, 1954, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, H 4019, FOA.

  86. 86.

    The study showed that heavy water could be produced at Ljungaverken at a cost of three million SEK per 2 tons. This was a high price considering that the Norwegian price was 1 million SEK per ton.

  87. 87.

    Alltjämt ett starkt försvar. ÖB-förslaget 1954 (Still, A Strong Defence. The Supreme Commander’s Proposal 1954).

  88. 88.

    D. Holloway, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War in Europe’. See also, David Holloway, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962’.

  89. 89.

    K. Skogrand and R. Tames, Fryktens likevekt. Atombomben, Norge og verden (The Atom Bomb, Norway and the World) 1945–1970 (Oslo, Tiden 2001), p. 80.

  90. 90.

    The ÖB-54 report, p. 275. On the geographic connection to Norway and military cooperation between Sweden and Norway during the Cold War, see M. Petersson, Brödrafolkens väl. Svensk-norska säkerhetspolitiska relationer 1949–1969 (Stockholm: Santérus förlag, 2003).

  91. 91.

    ‘Kostnadsberäkning av anläggning för isolering av plutonium’ (Cost Estimation of a Plant for the Isolation of Plutonium) by Jan Rydberg and Sten Mogensen, 28 January 1954, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, H 4091; ‘Tillägg till Kostnadsberäkning av anläggning för isolering av plutonium’ (Supplement to cost estimation of a plant for the isolation of plutonium) by Jan Rydberg, 30 April 1954, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, H 4092; ‘PM angående arbeten med plutonium inom sektionen för kärnkemi’ (Memorandum on work with plutonium in the section for nuclear chemistry), 13 February 1955, H 4017; ‘Kostnadsberäkning av anläggning för isolering av plutonium’ (Cost estimation on a plant for the isolation of plutonium), by Jan Rydberg, 20 June 1955, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, H 2246, FOA.

  92. 92.

    ‘Frågor av betydelse för isolering av plutonium för atombomber; förslag till arbetsprogram’. (‘Issues of Importance for the Isolation of Plutonium for Atomic Bombs; Proposal for Work Programme’) by Jan Rydberg, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, 27 January 1955, H 4140, FOA.

  93. 93.

    ‘Frågor av betydelse för isolering av plutonium för atombomber; förslag till arbetsprogram’.

  94. 94.

    ‘Frågor av betydelse för isolering av plutonium för atombomber; förslag till arbetsprogram’.

  95. 95.

    ‘Frågor av betydelse för isolering av plutonium för atombomber; förslag till arbetsprogram’.

  96. 96.

    ‘Kostnadsberäkning av anläggning för isolering av plutonium’.

  97. 97.

    ‘Utredning av betingelserna för framställning av atomvapen i Sverige’ (Study of the Conditions for the Production of Atomic Weapons in Sweden) by Torsten Magnusson, 25 November 1955, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, 87-H 163:1-21A, FOA.

  98. 98.

    D. Fischer, The History of the International Atomic Energy Agency, The First Forty Years (Vienna 1997), http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf, Accessed 1 January 2016.

  99. 99.

    Up to the summer of 1955, the expectation was that the bombs would have to contain at least 10 kg of plutonium (for example, the 1953 study calculated with 11 kg of plutonium in every device). At the Geneva Conference, certain calculations were released concerning the critical mass of a device that meant that the Swedish National Defence Research Agency’s calculations could be heavily revised.

    Jonter, Sweden and the Bomb, p. 47. See also Swedish Ministry of Defence, Svensk kärnvapenforskning (Swedish Nuclear Research), 1945–1972, 50–51. For studies of the manufacture of U-235, see Vilhelm Nordström, ‘Gasdiffusionsanläggning’ (Building gas diffusion) H-pärm II, 171–260, Direktionsarkivet, 11 February 1955, DA.

  100. 100.

    Jonter, Sweden and the Bomb, p. 47. See also Svensk kärnvapenforskning, 50–51. For studies of a manufacture of U-235, see Nordström, ‘Gasdiffusionsanläggning’.

  101. 101.

    S. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 41.

  102. 102.

    Meyer did not investigate Swedish expertise himself—see footnote 3 above.

  103. 103.

    L. Berns, ‘A 36—SAABs atombombare avslöjad’ (The A36—SAAB’s Nuclear Bomber Unveiled), Flygrevyn no. 4 (1991).

  104. 104.

    ‘Kärnladdningsgruppens betänkande’ (Report of the nuclear device group), HH 006, FOA.

  105. 105.

    DATASAABs historia—Tema Flyg (Linköping: Datasaabs vänner, 1995), pp. 39–42.

  106. 106.

    For a more in-depth analysis of the motives behind the conference, see John Krige, ‘Atoms for Peace, Scientific internationalism and Scientific Intelligence’, in Global Power Knowledge: Sciences and Technology in International Affairs, J. Krige and K. Barth (Eds.), Osiris, 2nd series, 21 (2006).

  107. 107.

    M. Fridlund, Den gemensamma utvecklingen: Staten, storföretaget och samarbetet kring den svenska elkrafttekniken (The Common Trend: The State, Large Enterprises, and Collaboration on Swedish Electric Power Technology), (Stockholm: Stenhag, 1999).

  108. 108.

    Harry Brynielsson, among others, was appointed to the committee as an expert. Bränsleförsörjningen i atomåldern: Betänkande, SOU 1956:46 (Fuel Management in the Nuclear Age: Report), (Stockholm, 1956), (Part 2, 1956: 58).

  109. 109.

    A. Schagerholm, För het att hantera: Kärnkraftsfrågan i svensk politik (Too hot to handle: Nuclear issue in Swedish politics), 1945–1980 (Historiska institutionen, Göteborg, 1993).

  110. 110.

    Atomenergien: Betänkande med förslag, SOU 1956:11 (Atomic Energy: Report with Proposals) (Stockholm, 1956).

  111. 111.

    Subordinated to the Atomic Energy Delegation was the Reactor Location Committee, a body responsible for security-related issues, see Jonter, Sverige, USA och kärnenergin, p. 23.

  112. 112.

    See M. Fjæstad, Visionen om outtömlig energi: Bridreaktorn i svensk kärnkraftshistoria (The Vision of Inexhaustible Energy: The Fast Breeder Reactor in Swedish Nuclear Power History), 1945–80, (Hedemora 2010).

  113. 113.

    Wittrock and Lindström, De stora programmens tid, p. 75.

  114. 114.

    Svensk atomenergipolitik (Swedish Atomic Energy Policy), pp. 21–22.

  115. 115.

    Ahlmark, Den svenska atomvapendebatten, p. 23.

  116. 116.

    Nilsson, Atomvapnet som partiproblem, p. 42.

  117. 117.

    ÖB-utredningarna 1957. Kontakt med krigsmakten 1957: pp. 10–12 (ÖB-investigations 1957. Contact with the Armed Forces 1957), Stockholm 1957.

  118. 118.

    Agrell, Svenska förintelsevapen, p. 155.

  119. 119.

    Svenska förintelsevapen, p.155.

  120. 120.

    Svenska förintelsevapen, p. 155.

  121. 121.

    ÖB-utredningarna 1957. Kontakt med krigsmakten 1957, pp. 10–12.

  122. 122.

    ‘P.M. angående utredningsuppdrag betr. reaktorer för produktion av plutonium av vapenkvalitet’ (‘Memorandum on Study Assignment Concerning Reactors for the Production of Weapons-Grade Plutonium’), 5 July 1957, Swedish National Defence Research Institute, H 4050-2092, FOA.

  123. 123.

    ‘Redogörelse för forskningsverksamheten vid försvarets forskningsanstalt under budgetåret 1957/58’ (‘Report on research activity at the Swedish National Defence Research Agency during fiscal year 1957/58’), Swedish National Defence Research Agency H 1252/58, FOA.

  124. 124.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 77.

  125. 125.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 87 et seq.

  126. 126.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), 88.

  127. 127.

    ‘Berättelse över verksamheten vid Försvarets forskningsanstalt under budgetåret 1958/59’ (‘Report on activity at the Swedish National Defence Research Agency during fiscal year 1958/59’), Swedish National Defence Research Agency, H 3457/51, FOA.

  128. 128.

    Letter to AE signed M. Fehrm, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, H 4034–2092, FOA.

  129. 129.

    Fröman, ‘Kärnvapenforskning’, pp. 58, 105; Forssberg’s study (basis), 91, p. 116.

  130. 130.

    Fröman, ‘Kärnvapenforskning’, p. 76.

  131. 131.

    ‘Forskningsprogram för framtagande av underlag för konstruktion av atomladdningar’ (‘Research Programme for the Production of Basic Information for the Design of Atomic Explosive Devices’), July 1958, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, H 4041-2092, FOA.

  132. 132.

    ‘Forskningsprogram avseende skydd och försvar mot atomvapen’ (‘Research Programme Concerning Protection and Defence against Atomic Weapons’), 4 July 1958, Swedish National Defence Research Agency, H 4040-2092, FOA.

  133. 133.

    Bill 1958:110; SU B 53; rskr. B 83.

  134. 134.

    Larsson, ‘Kärnkraftens historia i Sverige’.

  135. 135.

    Swedish Ministry of Defence, Svensk kärnvapenforskning 1945–1972.

  136. 136.

    In November, AE replied to the Swedish National Defence Research Agency and described how and in what order the investigation work should be done. 20 November 1959, H 4067-2092. The Swedish National Defence Research Agency accepted AE’s proposed approach. 26 November 1959, H 4071-2092, FOA.

  137. 137.

    ‘Beträffande D 2 0-anläggning’, 19 August 1959; ‘AE Utredningar om tungt vatten 1957–1967, 1970–1974 (SKI tillstånd). Uran 1956–1962, Allmänt 1957–1959 Prognoser 1960’ DA.

  138. 138.

    Jonter, Sverige, USA och kärnenergin, p. 25.

  139. 139.

    ‘D 2 0-anläggning’, 19 August 1959; ‘AE Utredningar om tungt vatten 1957–1967, 1970–1974 (SKI tillstånd). Uran 1956–1962, Allmänt 1957–1959, Beträffande Prognoser 1960’, DA.

  140. 140.

    ‘Förslag till arbetsprogram och budget för det fortsatta D 2 0-arbetet’; ‘AE Utredningar om tungt vatten 1957–1967, 1970–1974 (SKI tillstånd). Uran 1956–1962, Allmänt 1957–1959 Prognoser 1960’, DA.

  141. 141.

    In November, AE replied to the Swedish National Defence Research Agency and described how and in what order the investigation work should be done, 20 November 1959, H 4067-2092. Swedish National Defence Research Agency accepted AE’s proposed approach, 26 November 1959, H 4071-2092, FOA.

  142. 142.

    ‘Koncept till brev till FOA’, 11 November 1959, ‘Hemliga handlingar’, DA.

  143. 143.

    Olof Forssberg’s study (basis), p. 103.

  144. 144.

    Jonter, Sverige, USA och kärnenergin, p. 23; Svensk atomenergipolitik, p. 32; Larsson ‘Kärnkraftens historia i Sverige’ (1987), p. 145. AK’s responsibility was split into two functions: DFA was in charge of the control and delivery of licences in the nuclear energy field, while the Statens råd för atomforskning was responsible for basic research. DFA was transformed into the SKI in 1974.

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    Thomas Jonter

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Jonter, T. (2016). The Development of a Latent Capability to Produce Nuclear Weapons, 1945–59. In: The Key to Nuclear Restraint. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58113-6_3

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