Abstract
This chapter presents policy misfit as a first important motivation for governments to subject supranational acts to judicial review. To support this argument, it presents a case study on the French government under Prime Minister Édouard Balladur initiating an action for annulment against a Communication published by the Commission on private pension funds. With this action for annulment, the French government asked the European Court of Justice to review the legality of this Communication. This instance of government litigation was motivated by the high level of policy misfit created by the Communication. Since the Communication would have opened national markets of EU member states to privately run pension funds, its contents were completely at odds with the French paradigm in the area of supplementary pensions.
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Notes
- 1.
Commission. (1994). Commission Communication on the Freedom of Management and Investment of Funds held by Institutions for Retirement Provision (94/C 360/08). Official Journal of the European Communities C (360): 7–11.
- 2.
Judgment of the Court of 20 March 1997 in the Case C-57/95: France v Commission. European Court Reports 1997: I-1640.
- 3.
Judgment of the Court of 16 June 1993. French Republic v Commission of the European Communities. Case C-325/91. European Court Reports 1993: I-03283.
- 4.
Proposal for a Council Directive relating to the Freedom of Management and Investment of Funds held by Institutions for Retirement Provision, COM (91) 301 final—SYN 363, Official Journal of the European Communities 1991: C 312/3: 3.
- 5.
In fact, the creation of the Fonds de Solidaritévieillesse as a pay-as-you-go fund paying for “undue charges” as part of this reform is even interpreted as an attempt to strengthen the French paradigm with its strong roots in a Bismarckian welfare state tradition (Palier 2010a: 80).
- 6.
Generally, this supplementary scheme is referred to as ARRCO (Association des régimes de retraitecomplementaire). For executives there is an additional supplementary pension scheme called AGIRC (Association générale des institutions de retraite des cadres).
- 7.
Law on pension savings (Loi Thomas) du 26.3.1997 créant des plans d’épargneretraite; loi 97–277.
- 8.
Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the Activities and Supervision of Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision. Official Journal L 235, 23/09/2003 P. 0010–0021.
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Adam, C. (2016). Policy Misfit and Governmental Litigation. In: The Politics of Judicial Review. European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57832-7_2
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