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Greece’s Association with the Recovery and Reconstruction of Europe: The Lessons from 1948

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The Post-War Reconstruction of Greece

Abstract

During the last quarter of 1947, in the face of an unsettled economic situation in Greece, the American Mission and the Embassy had forced the Department of State and the Treasury to accept some significant deviations from the previously authorized American policy in Greece. This policy deviation was made under pressure from the Greek leadership, and on the basis that in Greece, more than anywhere else in Europe, the geo-political arm of the US aid program was paramount.

The President of the European Commission Mr. Jacques Delors is rumored to be considering cuts in the assistance Greece was to receive, in order to make its economy competitive with the oncoming pan–European market of 1992. It is thought that the reasons are to be found in the lack of preparation of adequate investment plans on the Greek side for the investment of these funds.

Greek daily Kathimerini, 2 August 1989

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Notes

  1. 1.

    FRUS;1947/V/478;1948/IV/1.

  2. 2.

    These reforms included the undertakings under the unilateral act of the Greek Government of June and the contractual obligation of the Greek Government in the agreement of 8 July 1947 to introduce a rationing scheme.

  3. 3.

    FRUS;1948/IV/1.

  4. 4.

    N.O. B-4/Feb/1948/208–209.

  5. 5.

    FRUS;1948/IV/7–8. This was in addition to the $55 million of surplus property extended in 1946 and 1947, bringing total surplus property credits up to $80 million.

  6. 6.

    President 2nd, p. 21; FRUS;1946/VIII/175, 232; FRUS;1947/V/171.

  7. 7.

    FRUS;1948/IV/29–30.

  8. 8.

    N.O. B-4/Feb/1948/206, 209.

  9. 9.

    N.O. B–6/Apr/1948/304.

  10. 10.

    N.O. B–6/Apr/1948/305.

  11. 11.

    N.O. B-7/May/1948/362.

  12. 12.

    N.O. B-9/Jul/1948/460.

  13. 13.

    N.O. Γ-3/Jan/1949/126–128.

  14. 14.

    Wittner (1982) p. 246.

  15. 15.

    With the concurrent opinion of Eisenhower, the Chief of the JCS. FRUS;1948/IV/36–37.

  16. 16.

    Milward (1984).

  17. 17.

    N.O. A-6/Apr/1947/304.

  18. 18.

    Zolotas (1945) p. 4.

  19. 19.

    To Vima 5/Feb/1946

  20. 20.

    His views on long-term development prospects of the Greek economy are best found in the economic Report he prepared in 1952 at the request of the Premier Plastiras, where his limited ambitions are documented. In the Preamble the first statement reads as follows: Greece is and will remain a country with limited economic potential, namely a poor country (p. 9). And he went on: The statement that Greece is and will remain a poor country means two things: First, that an increase in the national income, however great in itself, would not allow Greece to cease being a poor country and become one of the rich countries (p. 11). See Varvaressos Report (1952) For an English translation see: REPORT ON THE GREEK ECONOMIC PROBLEM Prepared By PROFESSOR KYRIAKOS VARIVARESSOS At the Request Of THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE Translated from Greek by Rena Zafiriou, Washington DC 12/Feb/ 1952, pp. 1, 3 respectively.

  21. 21.

    Min.Par. for 7, 12 June and 19 July 1946, pp. 168–197.

  22. 22.

    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Preliminary Report on Greece Part I, March 1948, pp. 1.

  23. 23.

    Min.Par. p. 197. This was also the view of MP P. Sotiropoulos, Min.Par. p. 196.

  24. 24.

    Min.Par. for 19/Jul/1946 p. 261.

  25. 25.

    Min.Par. for 12/Jun/1946 p. 203.

  26. 26.

    See the report of the Confederation of Greek Industrialists (SEB) Greek Industries and Their Critics, Athens 1946; also the editorial comments of D. Philaretos in Asyrmatos.

  27. 27.

    A. Hadjopoulos Oι Προστάτες (The Protectors), Papazissis, Athens 1977, p. 225 ff.; Zighdis, interview of September 1989. The matter of the emergence of a new power bloc has already been discussed (in sociological and economic terms) by Tsoukalas and Vergopoulos respectively; see their contribution to Iatrides , ed. (1981), pp. 319 ff and 298 ff. respectively.

  28. 28.

    Gouras (1957) p. 27; Bank II, p. 405.

  29. 29.

    Bank II p. 405.

  30. 30.

    Food and Agricultural Organization of United Nations, Report of the FAO Mission for Greece. Washington, 1947.

  31. 31.

    See Gounarakis ’ statement in Minutes of the first EAPPE Meeting, 1/Aug/1946, Georgios Koumoulos Archive (hereafter referred to as KA), preserved at the Historical and Literary Archive (ELIA), Athens, Φ I/3 p. 2.

  32. 32.

    Address to the members of the plenary session of EAPPE on 10/Oct/1946, K.A. I/3, pp. 3–4.

  33. 33.

    Ανώτατον Οικονομικόν Συμβούλιον «Περί του δυνατού της αυξήσεως της παραγωγής και καταναλώσεως του εγγχωρίου λιγνίτου» Αθήνα 1933, estimated total potential deposits nationwide at156 million tons.

  34. 34.

    On the wartime committee of the National Bank of Greece see p. 203.

  35. 35.

    On the ASA program see pp. 193–209.

  36. 36.

    Even Batsis , the left-leaning economist, was ambivalent about the thermal basis of the power program and the supply of lignite. See Batsis (1947) pp. 44–45 (page numbers refer to the more widely available 1977 reprint).

  37. 37.

    World Bank (March 1948) pp. 16–17. “An almost complete lack of fuel—Greece’s only supplies are a relatively small quantity of lignite—has inhibited the development of industry.”

  38. 38.

    See the 3 volume Report Electric Power Program, Kingdom of Greece, for the Economic Cooperation Administration, Washington DC, prepared by Ebasco Services Inc, New York 1950.

  39. 39.

    See minutes of discussion on industrial cost on 5/Sep/46, and Zighdis ’ support document of 4/Sep/1946 on the firm rejection of calculation of import duty as an element of imports, in the archive of Georgios Koumoulos , preserved at ELIA (thereafter KA ELIA) ΦI3 p. 2. Naturally, such proposals had other wide-ranging implications, such as implying a shift of taxation from indirect to direct, since import duties provided a quarter of total state receipts from taxation.

  40. 40.

    The researcher will be even more attracted if he has the opportunity to consult the background material used for this study, part of the K.A.

  41. 41.

    Indeed, all Greek industrialization studies were influenced by this report, though the parenthood can be misplaced in some cases. See one recent major studies, A. Gianitsis , H Eλληνική Bιομηχανία: Aνάπτυξη και Kρίση (The Greek Industry, Growth and Crisis) Athens 1983 p. 33; like many other writers, Gianitsis attributes Greek industrialization plans to the 1948 GLTP, which itself was a poor imitation of this study. On the GLTP , see p. 193 ff.

  42. 42.

    Ministry of National Economy, A Short Critique on the UNRRA Publication on the “Mineral Resources of Greece” by Aristoteles Tsakonas , Head of the Department of Mineral Research, Ministry of National Economy, Athens 1948, pp. 3–5.

  43. 43.

    D. Batsis , H Bαρειά Bιομηχανία στην Eλλάδα (Heavy Industry in Greece) Athens 1947.

  44. 44.

    And he was criticized for that by the left; see Kitsikis, in Batsis (1947) p. 18.

  45. 45.

    Min.Par. for 7/Jun/1946 p. 168, 17/Jul/1946 pp. 256–258. Also, Diomidis Archive, part preserved at the Historical and Literary Archive (ELIA) currently at the Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece (MIET) Athens, [hereafter referred to as D.A.ELIA/MIET] Φ51/25.

  46. 46.

    W. H. McNeill , Greece: American Aid in Action, 1947–1956, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York 1957, p. 31.

  47. 47.

    Milward (1984) Chap. 1, pp. 43–55.

  48. 48.

    This information is based on interviews of the author with Zighdis as well as on the similar content of a memorandum on these contacts, submitted in the fall of that year by Zighdis to Stephanopoulos , see K.A. ΦI4 “Confidential Memorandum for the Minister of Coordination”, dated 7 October 1947. Zighdis reconfirmed the content of that Memorandum in the interviews. There is also an entry in Porter ’s diary on his meeting with Zighdis and his appreciation of the young economists’ views on the potential for economic development, [Porter thought he was too much on the left in terms of politics], see M. Psalidopoulos Ζητείται ένα Θαύμα για την Ελλάδα (Wanted: a Miracle for Greece) Athens 2006, p. 162.

  49. 49.

    N.O. 9/1947, pp. 506–510.

  50. 50.

    Zolotas in To Vima 6/Apr/1947.sd.

  51. 51.

    This was raised in Parliament, see Min.Parl. for 23/Jan/1947 pp. 930–931.

  52. 52.

    That this aspect of the program was the only one envisaged by the Government can also be gathered from Min.Par. for 7 June, 12 June, and 19 July 1946, pp. 168 ff; N.O. A-8/Jun/1947/432; Bank II p. 401.

  53. 53.

    Diomidis later, at the close of the Civil War, in 1949–1950, served as PM see p. 227. For a comprehensive biography see Chap. 1.

  54. 54.

    Bank I 1947, p. 20.

  55. 55.

    Bank I 1947, p. 20.

  56. 56.

    Also Rector of Athens Technical University (EMP), the major Greek technical university.

  57. 57.

    D.A.ELIA/MIET Φ51/27, dated 14/Jan/1948; D.A.ELIA/MIET Φ51/28, 29, 30, 32.

  58. 58.

    N.O. A-11/Sep-1947/597.

  59. 59.

    D.A.ELIA/MIET Φ51/21 dated 1/Dec/1947 p. 3.

  60. 60.

    Zolotas in To Vima 30/May/1948.

  61. 61.

    Zolotas was referring to the estimates on war and Occupation devastation of Greece drawn by C. Doxiadis, the coordinator of Reconstruction. Doxiadis was instrumental in this endeavor; according to Michalis Psalidopoulos Επιτηρητές σε Απόγνωση (Monitors in Despair) Athens 2013 p. 19, his estimates of war damage of US$15 billion should be compared to the findings of the UN EcoSoC that retained an estimate of US$1–2 billion.

  62. 62.

    Zolotas to Diomidis, dated 18/Dec/1947, D.A.ELIA/MIET Φ51/11&12 dated 17/Dec/1947.

  63. 63.

    D.A.ELIA/MIET Φ51/35 dated 28/1/1948; D.A.ELIA/MIET Φ51/36 dated 21/Jan/1948.

  64. 64.

    Interview of the author with Zighdis, 6 September 1989.

  65. 65.

    Letter of Resignation X. Zolotas and I. Zighdis to Minister D. Helmis, d. 21/Aug/1948, D.A.NP: ΦΣT/36.

  66. 66.

    Nicolaides , the Greek representative in the OEEC, has disseminated the idea that the 1948 program was the basis of the Greek post-war efforts at industrialization ; see in particular Nicolaides’ article in Economicos Tachydromos no 920, d. 9/Dec/1971, 16/Dec/1971. Zolotas , who had resigned from his post of governor of the Bank of Greece in protest to the military takeover, wrote back and strongly opposed Nicolaides claim that ASA played any positive role in Greece’s industrialization; so did Zighdis , who was the Parliamentarian who spend most of the seven year military rule in jail; see X Zolotas “Το Ξεκίνημα της Εκβιομηχάνισης της Ελλάδος” (The origins of Post-War industrialization) in Economicos Tachydromos d. 13/Jan/1972 and Zigdis : Η Εκβιομηχάνιση της Μεταπολεμικής Ελλάδος και ο Ουσιώδης Ρόλος της ΟΥΝΡΑ (The Industrialization of Post War Greece and the substantive role of UNRRA) Economicos Tachydromos 6/Jan/1972.

  67. 67.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/54 p. 5, 9, 10 ff d. 9/Nov/1948 on the objections on supporting non-competitive industry

  68. 68.

    He retained the same responsibility with the ECA Mission. The ECA Mission to Greece replaced the civilian part of Amag from the autumn of 1948 by a transplant of Amag’s civil affairs personnel.

  69. 69.

    The steel project alone would absorb $12 million.

  70. 70.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/54 p. 5, 10 ff d. 9/Nov/1948.

  71. 71.

    1926 is the year the Greek translation was published; originally the thesis was published in German in 1926.

  72. 72.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/54. d. 9/Nov/1948, p. 1. This was not the only issue. According to Doxiadis, “Big Hydro should come under urbanism”. In response the USA froze the financing of the power program until the issue of thermal base for electricity was resolved and a specialized institution to handle the power program was created and started operating.

  73. 73.

    K. Kegel , «Η Έρευνα του Λιγνιτικού προβλήματος της Ελλάδος» (Survey of the Lignite problem of Greece), Τεχνικά Χρονικά, issue 176, 15/4/1939.

  74. 74.

    N.O. Γ-2/Dec-1948/77–79.

  75. 75.

    The four-year reconstruction program provided in the first phase for Ladon, Acheloos (phase one), Voraikos, Vodas and Louros, while starting Aliakmon and Lissa, a river in the Thessaly area, Central Greece. D.A.NP ΦΣT/55 d. 11/Nov/1948. It left the question of thermal power for the future even though experts had advised that this would be insufficient to cover demand from industry.

  76. 76.

    Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Ανασυγκροτήσεως (Higher Reconstruction Council – ASA), Προσωρινό Mακροχρόνιο Πρόγραμμα της Eλλάδος 1948–1952 (Temporary Long Term Plan of Economic Recovery of Greece, 1948–1952), Athens 1948.

  77. 77.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/55, dated 11/Nov/1948.

  78. 78.

    ASA (1948).

  79. 79.

    By the time it was published, it had already been revised. Together with the long-term program, annual reconstruction programs for the first two years were submitted to the OEEC.

  80. 80.

    Bank I 1948, pp. 17–21. On the debate on the OEEC approval, see p. 207.

  81. 81.

    Bank I 1948, pp. 17–21.

  82. 82.

    Bank I 1948, pp. 17–21.

  83. 83.

    Bank II, p. 403.

  84. 84.

    Bank I 1948, p. 17.

  85. 85.

    This was indeed the view of Christos Evelpidis , a former minister and a well-respected expert on the Greek economy. N.O. Δ-2/Feb/1950/65.

  86. 86.

    Quoted by Zighdis in N.O. Γ-8/Jun/1949/345.

  87. 87.

    Letter of instruction to the ASA by the Minister of Coordination, Stephanopoulos, in ASA (1948).

  88. 88.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/31 d. 10/May/1948. (Diomidis’ memo on the NBG). The same argument can be found in ΦΣT/31 (Greek version) d. 10/May/1948 and ΦΣT/34 (English version), on the draft decision to transfer funds on the above lines, dated 25/Jun/1948.

  89. 89.

    Later this function was transferred to the Central Credit Committee (Κεντρική Επιτροπή Δανείων–KEΔ), an institution also independent from commercial banks.

  90. 90.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/33 d. 15/Jun/1948.

  91. 91.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/34 d 23, 25/Jun/1945.

  92. 92.

    Chapter 3 p. 55 ff. and Chap. 5 p. 132. D.A.NP ΦΣT/34. Manzavinos himself was opposed to such a policy; D.A.NP ΦΣT/56.

  93. 93.

    Another member of ASA Higher Board and the Economic Advisor to the Minister of Coordination.

  94. 94.

    Gounarakis had forecasted demand for counterpart funds at $614 million, with exchange rated 10 dr/$, in order to finance domestic reconstruction expenditure.

  95. 95.

    Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the General Council of the National Bank of Greece pp. 68–71, book 26, IAETE, Α1S3Y3B26. Among its members were Gounarakis but most importantly Georgios Andreakos, an engineer and senior inspector in the Greek State Railways (ΣΕΚ). ΣΕΚ had at the request of Metaxas invited Kegel in 1937 to conduct the lignite survey in Ptolemais. Railways were considered in the 1920’s as a prime customer for lignite as high voltage transmission lines, a recent development then, were not widely known in Greece.

  96. 96.

    A. Alexander, Greek Industrialists, An Economic and Social Analysis Center of Planning and Economic Research (CPER). Athens 1964, pp. 68–73, 102, 121, 128.

  97. 97.

    This claim is supported by the already mentioned evidence that Clay was influenced by the work of EAPPE is documented in the Minutes of ASA kept by its Chairman, A. Diomidis [see p. 197.] The description, which Zighdis gave to the writer, took place during an interview in September 1988, and was confirmed in a further interview in September 1989. Zighdis described to me how Clay had been influenced by the EAPPE study to support the industrialization of Greece, and how he became an enthusiastic supporter of the EAPPE plans to industrialize Greece.

  98. 98.

    Officially accepted before parliament by incoming Minister of Coordination Stephanopoulos; see Min.Par. for 13/Jun/1946 p. 208.

  99. 99.

    See earlier unsuccessful proposals by Tsaldaris, p. 162.

  100. 100.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/57, dated 13/11/1948.

  101. 101.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/136, d. 18/Dec/1948.

  102. 102.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/136, d. 18/Dec/1948.

  103. 103.

    In review Οικονομικός Ταχυδρόμος issue no 920–921, d. 9/Dec/1971, 16/Dec/ 1971. Zolotas wrote back and strongly opposed Nicolaides’ claim that ASA played any positive role in Greece’s industrialization; so did Zighdis; see X Zolotas “Το Ξεκίνημα της Εκβιομηχάνισης της Ελλάδος” (The origins of Post-War industrialization) in Economicos Tachydromos Athens d. 13/Jan/1972 and Zigdis: Η Εκβιομηχάνιση της Μεταπολεμικής Ελλάδος και ο Ουσιώδης Ρόλος της ΟΥΝΡΑ (The Industrialization of Post War Greece and the substantive role of UNRRA) Economicos Tachydromos Athens 6/Jan/1972.

  104. 104.

    See for instance Zolotas’ coverage of the reconstruction in his articles in daily To Vima, and articles by various authors in monthly N.O.

  105. 105.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/136, dated 8/Dec/1948.

  106. 106.

    D. Benas H Eισβολή του Ξένου Kεφαλαίου στην Eλλάδα (The Invasion of Foreign Capital in Greece) Papazissis, Athens 1976, p. 37; Y. Dovas, Oικονομία της Eλλάδας (The Economy of Greece), Sychroni Epochi, Athens 1980, p. 64–65.

  107. 107.

    Alexander (1982).

  108. 108.

    FRUS;1948/IV/177.

  109. 109.

    FRUS;1948/IV/26.

  110. 110.

    FRUS;1948/IV/28.

  111. 111.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/38 d. 20/Sep/1948.

  112. 112.

    Quite the contrary was true; Zighdis in N. O. Γ-8/Jun/1949/335 ff.

  113. 113.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/39 d. 20/Sep/1948.

  114. 114.

    Manzavinos had earlier expressed doubts over the Diomidis plans. See D.A.NP ΦΣT/56, dated 12/Nov/1948.

  115. 115.

    Diomidis memo to Stefanopoulos, D.A.NP ΦΣT/40; D.A.NP ΦΣT/50.

  116. 116.

    D.A.NP ΦΣT/40.

  117. 117.

    N.O.B-12/Oct-1948/613.

  118. 118.

    FRUS;1948/IV/157.

  119. 119.

    N.O.Γ-2/Dec-1948/77–79; Γ-3/Jan/1949/126–128.

  120. 120.

    FRUS;1948/IV/169.

  121. 121.

    FRUS;1949/VI/229.

  122. 122.

    Zolotas To Vima 8/Jan/1949.

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    Fig. 8.2
    figure 2

    Sovereign, 1948 market price in drachmas

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    Politakis, G. (2018). Greece’s Association with the Recovery and Reconstruction of Europe: The Lessons from 1948. In: The Post-War Reconstruction of Greece. Palgrave Studies in Democracy, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship for Growth. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57734-4_8

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