International Organizations as Shields in Cameroonian Foreign Policy

  • Ada Peter
  • Remi Mbida Mbida
Part of the Contemporary African Political Economy book series (CONTAPE)


This chapter argues that although Cameroon is frequently referred to as “timid” in its pursuit of foreign policy, it uses international organizations as “shields” in three ways: To shield it from its history of isolationism; To shield it from economic and security volatility; and to shield it from international interference in its domestic affairs.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ada Peter
    • 1
  • Remi Mbida Mbida
    • 2
  1. 1.Covenant UniversityOtaNigeria
  2. 2.International Relations Institute of CameroonYaoundéCameroon

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