Abstract
This chapter explores the link between the European Ombudsman and the question of the EU’s democratisation. It shows that the Ombudsman is part of the debates and amendments aiming to render the EU more accessible, legitimate and accountable and that the European Ombudsman herself actually contributes to this democratisation. Indeed, the European Ombudsman’s role and various initiatives and activities can strengthen democracy by rendering the EU more accessible, and promoting a broader understanding of European citizenship. Simultaneously, it is underlined that there are limits to the nature and scope of the Ombudsman’s contribution to democracy. The last sections of the chapter examine to what extent the Ombudsman has legitimacy, is independent (a necessary precondition in order for the Ombudsman to perform her functions) and accountable (which may be viewed as the other side of independence). In the context of the discussion on independence, the chapter queries whether the Ombudsman should unambiguously be classified among classic parliamentary ombudsman institutions.
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Notes
- 1.
For example, in Spain and in Portugal, ombudsman institutions were created shortly after these states restored democratic rule; see Katja Heede, European Ombudsman: Redress and control at Union level (Kluwer 2000) 83. See also Söderman’s solemn oath: ‘In general, countries establish the office of the Ombudsman to strengthen and promote democracy and the rule of law’; Annual Report 1995, 22.
- 2.
European Ombudsman, ‘Strategy of the European Ombudsman: Towards 2019’ (2014) at 2.
- 3.
Ian Harden, ‘When Europeans complain: The work of the European Ombudsman’ (2000) 3 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 199, at 201.
- 4.
Trevor Buck, Richard Kirkham and Brian Thompson The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice (Ashgate 2011) 37.
- 5.
International Ombudsman Institute, ‘Wellington Declaration’ (2012) available at: www.theioi.org/the-i-o-i.
- 6.
Ibid.
- 7.
‘Table ronde: Le Médiateur européen: 10 ans d’activité’ in Symeon Karagiannis and Yves Petit (eds) Le Médiateur européen: Bilan et perspectives (Bruylant 2007) 137, at 148 (comments by Mats Melin).
- 8.
Buck et al. (n 4) 46–49.
- 9.
Michael Nentwich, ‘Opportunity structures for citizens’ participation: The case of the European Union’ in Albert Weale and Michael Nentwich (eds) Political Theory and the European Union: Legitimacy, Constitutional Choice and Citizenship (Routledge 1998) 125.
- 10.
Stewart Hyson, ‘Ombudsman research project: The provincial and territorial ombuds-offices in Canada’ in Stewart Hyson (ed) Provincial and territorial ombudsman offices in Canada (Toronto University Press 2009) 3, at 15.
- 11.
Ibid. For the same reason, such participation can prove more ‘immediate’ and ‘personal’.
- 12.
Larry Hill, ‘The citizen participation-representation roles of American ombudsmen’ (1982) 13 Administration and Society 405. Participation as ‘instrumental action’ entails processes which influence elites and maximise interests, and there the ‘ombudsman does cause some values to be reallocated’; participation as ‘interaction’ entails processes whereby ‘values such as sharing, reciprocity, communication, justice and self-realisation are prominent’, and there the ombudsman ‘promotes a sense of political community by resolving some grievances, by explaining seemingly inexplicable decisions, and by existing as a symbol of government’s concern for citizens’ (ibid., at 429).
- 13.
Nick O’Brien and Brian Thompson, ‘Human rights and accountability in the UK: Deliberative democracy and the role of the ombudsman’ [2010] European Human Rights Law Review 504, at 508.
- 14.
Ibid., 506.
- 15.
Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1615 (2003), ‘The institution of Ombudsman’, point 3.
- 16.
See: ‘Democratic Deficit’, at: eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/democratic_deficit.html
- 17.
The reader must be aware that the present crises that the EU is facing have brought to prominence yet again the question of EU democracy; see, among the vast literature, Simona Piattoni (ed) The European Union: Democratic principles and institutional architectures in times of crisis (Oxford University Press 2015); Jürgen Habermas, The crisis of the European Union: A response (Polity Press 2013); Michael Blauberger, Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, Doris Wydra (eds) Symposium: Conventional wisdoms under challenge—Reviewing the EU’s democratic deficit in times of crisis (2014) 52 Journal of Common Market Studies 1171.
- 18.
For different perspectives see, for example, the well-known accounts of Giandomenico Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The question of standards’ (1998) 4 European Law Journal 5; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603.
- 19.
Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 533.
- 20.
Joseph Weiler ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 219.
- 21.
Jürgen Habermas, ‘Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe’ (2003) 14 Journal of Democracy 86.
- 22.
Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘European Demoicracy and its crisis’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 351.
- 23.
Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 233.
- 24.
Daniel Thym, ‘The elusive limits of solidarity: Residence rights of and social benefits for economically inactive Union citizens’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 17.
- 25.
Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting dynamics at the interface of integration and constitutionalism’ in Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca (eds) The evolution of EU law (Oxford University Press 2011) 575, at 598; for an overview of the academic debates on EU citizenship see also Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The essence of EU citizenship emerging from the last ten years of academic debate: Beyond the cherry blossoms and the moon?’ (2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 97.
- 26.
For an overview see Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger (eds) Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union (Rowman and Littlefield 2007).
- 27.
Nikos Vogiatzis, ‘The linguistic policy of the EU institutions and political participation post-Lisbon’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 176.
- 28.
Nentwich (n 9).
- 29.
Beate Kohler-Koch, ‘Civil society and EU democracy: “Astroturf” Representation?’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 100. For the problematic use of ‘European civil society’ by certain EU institutions compare Stijn Smismans, ‘European civil society: Shaped by discourses and institutional interests’ (2003) 9 European Law Journal 473.
- 30.
Sverker Gustavsson, Christer Karlsson and Thomas Persson (eds), The Illusion of Accountability in the European Union (Routledge 2009); Carol Harlow, Accountability in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2002).
- 31.
Deirdre Curtin, ‘Challenging executive dominance in European democracy’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 1.
- 32.
See Art 2 TEU; famously confirmed in Case 294/83, Les Verts v European Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, para 23. On the particularities of EU constitutionalism see further Giuseppe Martinico, The tangled complexity of the EU constitutional process: The frustrating knot of Europe (Routledge 2013).
- 33.
Compare Miguel Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as good as it gets?’ (2000) Webpapers on Constitutionalism and Governance beyond the State No 5/2000, at 6.
- 34.
See Nicole Scicluna, European Union constitutionalism in crisis (Routledge 2015), noting (on p. 147) that ‘EU policymakers [placed] undue faith in law as a means of furthering political objectives’.
- 35.
Christopher Lord, A democratic audit of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 19.
- 36.
Opinions differ as to whether the EU is a sui generis entity; see, for example, a critical perspective in Bruno de Witte, ‘The European Union as an international legal experiment’, in Gráinne de Búrca and Joseph Weiler (eds) The worlds of European constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2012) 19.
- 37.
Armin Von Bogdandy ‘The European lesson for international democracy: The significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for international organizations’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 323–324.
- 38.
See Art 10(2) TEU.
- 39.
See Arts 10 and 11 TEU.
- 40.
Art 12 TEU. For the role of national parliaments in the monitoring of the subsidiarity principle see also Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty.
- 41.
Art 10(4) TEU.
- 42.
Art 11(4) TEU, in conjunction with Art 24 TFEU.
- 43.
See Art 294 TFEU.
- 44.
Art 17(7) TEU.
- 45.
Art 16(8) TEU.
- 46.
See, for example, European Ombudsman (n 2).
- 47.
The Court of First Instance (CFI, now General Court) and, later on, the Civil Service Tribunal as a specialised court were established mainly for that purpose. For the CFI compare also Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, EU:C:1998:608, para 41. It goes beyond the purposes of this contribution to evaluate the latest reform within the Luxembourg Court, including the dissolution of the Civil Service Tribunal. For a critical perspective see Alberto Alemanno and Laurent Pech, ‘Reform of the EU’s court system: Why a more accountable—not a larger—Court is the way forward’ (2015) available at: verfassungsblog.de/reform-of-the-eus-court-system-why-a-more-accountable-not-a-larger-court-is-the-way-forward.
- 48.
- 49.
For a critical discussion of the ‘European Year of Citizens 2013’ see Nikos Vogiatzis, ‘A “European Year of Citizens”? Looking Beyond Decision 1093/2012: Eyeing the European Elections of 2014’ (2014) 15 Perspectives on European Politics and Society 571.
- 50.
Annual Report 2008, 10.
- 51.
Annual Report 1995, 22.
- 52.
Ibid.
- 53.
Alongside the right to petition the Parliament and the right to contact the EU institutions in one of the EU official languages; see further Vogiatzis (n 49).
- 54.
Alex Warleigh, ‘Purposeful Opportunists? EU Institutions and the Struggle over European Citizenship’ in Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh (eds.) Citizenship and Governance in the European Union (Continuum 2001) 19.
- 55.
Damian Chalmers et al. European Union Law: Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press 2010) 444.
- 56.
See Carlos Moreiro Gonzáles, ‘The Spanish proposal to the intergovernmental conference on political Union’ in The European Ombudsman: Origins, Establishment, Evolution (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 2005) 27, at 32–36.
- 57.
Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 447, at 456; Anchrit Wille, ‘The evolving EU accountability landscape: moving to an ever denser Union’ (2015) International Review of Administrative Sciences, DOI: 10.1177/0020852315589697, at 9–10.
- 58.
That is the case with the Parliamentary Ombudsman in the UK. A broad discussion in the UK as to whether or not the filter should be maintained has not produced yet any results pointing to its abolition.
- 59.
Peter Bonnor, ‘When EU civil society complains: civil society organisations and ombudsmanship at the European level’ in Stijn Smismans (ed) Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance (Edward Elgar 2006) 141.
- 60.
Anne Peters, ‘The European Ombudsman and the European Constitution’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 697, at 732.
- 61.
Indirectly, through the preliminary reference of Article 267 TFEU, the case may reach the Court. In that regard, it has been observed that the European Network of Ombudsmen may contribute to filling in ‘accountability gaps’ created inter alia by the limited accessibility to Union courts; see Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, ‘Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network Approach’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 542.
- 62.
Annual Report 1999, 12. In the same Report it was also mentioned that the Court, alongside the Ombudsman and the Court of Auditors are ‘the EU’s three primary supervisory bodies’; ibid., 271.
- 63.
See Art 2(4) of the Statute: A complaint ‘must be preceded by the appropriate administrative approaches to the institutions and bodies concerned’.
- 64.
Patrick Birkinshaw, European Public Law: The achievement and the challenge (Kluwer 2014) 576.
- 65.
See Case OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ.
- 66.
Annual Report 2008, 75.
- 67.
Jacob Söderman had proposed the insertion of an autonomous right to extra-judicial redress in the EU Treaties; see Annual Report 2002, 222–223.
- 68.
Micaela Lottini, ‘Correct Application of EU Law by National Public Administrations and Effective Individual Protection: The SOLVIT Network’ (2010) 3 Review of European Administrative Law 5, at 13–14.
- 69.
- 70.
More generally, for cross-border disputes related to civil and commercial matters see Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 136/3, stating inter alia (in Recital 6) that: ‘Mediation can provide a cost-effective and quick extrajudicial resolution of disputes in civil and commercial matters through processes tailored to the needs of the parties. Agreements resulting from mediation are more likely to be complied with voluntarily and are more likely to preserve an amicable and sustainable relationship between the parties.’ See also Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes (Directive on consumer ADR), OJ L 165/63, extensively discussed in Special edition on access to justice and consumer ADR (2016) 24 European Review of Private Law 1–186.
- 71.
See now Article 20(2)(d) TFEU and Art 24 TFEU (which refers to Art 228 TFEU).
- 72.
Art 43 of the Charter (part of Title V: Citizens’ rights). Relevant for the Ombudsman’s mandate are also Articles 41 (right to good administration) and 42 (right of access to documents) of the Charter.
- 73.
Peters (n 60) 723.
- 74.
Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘The European Union after Lisbon: Where next for European citizens?’ (2010) Speech at the University of Manchester, available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/activities/speech.faces/en/5470/html.bookmark
- 75.
Ibid.
- 76.
Jacob Söderman, ‘Transparency in the Community institutions: Speech at the 10th anniversary of the Court of First Instance’ (1999) available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/cfi10.htm
- 77.
Roy Gregory and Philip Giddings, ‘Citizenship, Rights and the EU Ombudsman’ in Bellamy and Warleigh (n 70) 73 and 87–88. According to the authors, the term ‘substantive rights’ refers to the so-called first, second and third generation of rights, while ‘procedural rights’ refer to good administration, including the right to be heard and the right to ‘corrective action’. See ibid., in particular 73 and 87–88.
- 78.
Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-234/02, European Ombudsman v Lamberts, EU:C:2003:394, para 55 (emphasis added).
- 79.
Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘Union citizenship after the Lisbon Treaty’, CEUS Research Working Paper 1/2010, p. 10; available at: http://www2.hull.ac.uk/fass/pdf/European%20Ombudsman%20CEUS%20paper%201.2010.pdf
- 80.
Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para 31.
- 81.
Emily O’Reilly, ‘European Year of Citizens —Closing conference’ (2013) available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/activities/speech.faces/en/52763/html.bookmark
- 82.
O’Brien and Thompson (n 13).
- 83.
Case C-28/08 P, Commission v Bavarian Lager EU:C:2010:378, para 65; see generally paras 41 et seq.
- 84.
See, for example, Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘“What I tell you three times is true”: Lawful residence and equal treatment after Dano’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 908; Thym (n 24).
- 85.
Koen Lenaerts, ‘Linking EU citizenship to democracy’ (2015) 11 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy VII–XVIII; Case C-650/13, Delvigne EU:C:2015:648.
- 86.
Rule 219 of European Parliament’s Rule of Procedure: ‘Election of the Ombudsman’.
- 87.
Compare also the views of the various Units of the office and of stakeholders prior to the first Strategy in Chap. 6.
- 88.
Special Eurobarometer ‘European Ombudsman’, Conducted by TNS Opinion and Social, Brussels (2011) available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/statistics/eb751_eb_report.faces
- 89.
Seventy-two per cent were not informed, only 14% were informed, while 13% admitted that they had ‘never heard of it’; ibid., 6.
- 90.
Ibid., 10–11. Southern European countries and the Benelux demonstrated a strong interest in the Ombudsman (the positive responses ranged from 74% to 54%). The lowest percentage was found in Slovakia, with 21%.
- 91.
Ibid., 12.
- 92.
Ibid., 13. On transparency, in particular, the overall response was generally disapproving. Also, many EU citizens did not know how efficient, transparent or service-minded the EU was.
- 93.
Ibid., 19.
- 94.
Ibid., 23.
- 95.
Ibid., 27.
- 96.
The Ombudsman’s Synthesis: The European Ombudsman and Citizens’ Rights (2011), available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/statistics/eb751_eo_synthesis.faces, at 11.
- 97.
Ibid., 12.
- 98.
This point is returned to in Chap. 6, where the ‘geographical scope’ of the mandate is discussed.
- 99.
See the Strategy 2019 at: http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/strategy/strategy.faces
- 100.
Due to space limitations, these notions (and the relevant literature) will not be considered here in their broader sense; rather, the focus will be on the European Ombudsman.
- 101.
See Wellington Declaration (n 5); Parliamentary Assembly (n 15); the criteria for membership of the British and Irish Ombudsman Association (now the ‘Ombudsman Association’), available at: www.ombudsmanassociation.org/association-membership.php
- 102.
Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘The work of the European Ombudsman and the European Network of Ombudsmen’ (2011) Speech delivered at the Erasmus for Public Administration Programme, available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/activities/speech.faces/en/10956/html.bookmark (emphasis added).
- 103.
Parliamentary Assembly (n 15) point 7.2.
- 104.
Art 228(3) TFEU. The Ombudsman may, of course, lecture on her mandate and related matters publicly. Thus, the Ombudsman’s academic activity may be compared to that of the CJEU judges, who are also independent.
- 105.
Arts 9 and 10 of the Statute.
- 106.
Art 10 of the Statute.
- 107.
Case C-234/02, European Ombudsman v Lamberts, EU:C:2004:174; see the relevant section in Chap. 2.
- 108.
Ibid., para 48.
- 109.
Although obviously a very different in nature post, interesting observations can be made with regard to the office of the Commission President; all Presidents since Jacques Santer (also Romano Prodi, Manuel Barroso and Jean-Claude Junker) before their appointment had previously served as Prime Ministers in their respective countries, and therefore as members of the European Council, too. In that sense, they switched from members of an intergovernmental institution to Presidents of a supranational institution.
- 110.
Emily O’Reilly was formerly the national ombudsman of Ireland; Nikiforos Diamandouros the national ombudsman of Greece; and Jacob Söderman the national ombudsman of Finland.
- 111.
See the discussion in Chap. 2.
- 112.
Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (Cambridge University Press 2009) 529.
- 113.
See, for example, Case 900/2010/(MF)RT.
- 114.
See Annual Report 1995, 5, 16. This issue is returned to in Chap. 6.
- 115.
Arts 6(1) and 13 of the Statute. If an office-holder retires, interim elections are organised. This took place when Söderman and Diamandouros decided to retire.
- 116.
Heede (n 1) 110.
- 117.
Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed (n 78), para 72.
- 118.
Case T-103/99 Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete, EU:T:2000:135, paras 21–23.
- 119.
Alexandros Tsadiras, ‘Of celestial motions and gravitational attractions: The institutional symbiosis between the European Ombudsman and the European Parliament’ (2009) 28 Yearbook of European Law 435, at 441.
- 120.
Gabriele Kucsko–Stadlmayer, European Ombudsman-Institutions: A Comparative Legal Analysis Regarding the Multifaceted Realisation of an Idea (Springer 2008) 10–11.
- 121.
Heede (n 1) 161.
- 122.
Tsadiras (n 119) 457.
- 123.
Ibid., 449. Harden observed, in this respect, that ‘the move to a separate budget merely formalised the existing situation’, in that it did not augment the de facto level of the Ombudsman’s budgetary independence; see Harden (n 3) 213.
- 124.
Annual Report 2009, 41: 11% or 38 opened inquiries.
- 125.
Annual Report 2015, 34 and Annual Report 2014, 19.
- 126.
See Tsadiras (n 119).
- 127.
See generally Giandomenico Majone, ‘The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems’ (1999) 22 West European Politics 1; on the European agencies Madalina Busuioc, ‘Accountability, control and independence: The case of European agencies’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 599.
- 128.
Buck et al. (n 4) 155–156.
- 129.
The Ombudsman’s method is further explained in Chap. 4.
- 130.
See Art 228(2) TFEU, Art 8 of the Statute and Rule 221 of Parliament’s Rule of Procedure.
- 131.
Buck et al. (n 4) 39.
- 132.
Ibid., 40.
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Vogiatzis, N. (2018). The Link Between the Role of the European Ombudsman and Democracy. In: The European Ombudsman and Good Administration in the European Union . European Administrative Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57395-7_3
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