Making the Self, I: Bodily Self-Consciousness

  • Michele Di Francesco
  • Massimo Marraffa
  • Alfredo Paternoster


The authors argue that there is not a pre-reflective self-consciousness that accompanies every conscious state from birth. This is an empirically void construction, still reminiscent of the Kantian transcendentalism. The outcome of this discussion is that the most minimal form of self-consciousness is bodily self-consciousness, the capacity to construct an analogical and imagistic representation of one’s own body as an entire object, simultaneously taking this representation as a subject, that is, as an active source of the representation of itself. This is coherent with a view of the self in which a distinction (reminiscent of James) must be drawn between the I and the Me, that is, the self as the interminable objectivation process and the self as the multidimensional representation continuously updated by this process.


Conscious Experience Conscious State Phenomenal Consciousness Representational Activity Primary Consciousness 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michele Di Francesco
    • 1
  • Massimo Marraffa
    • 2
  • Alfredo Paternoster
    • 3
  1. 1.School of Advanced Studies IUSS PaviaPaviaItaly
  2. 2.University of Roma TreRomeItaly
  3. 3.University of BergamoBergamoItaly

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